vulnerability-management
/vulnerability-management
Znajduje, priorytetyzuje i zamyka podatności w kodzie, zależnościach, obrazach i infrastrukturze, bez zalewania zespołu nieprzydatnymi alertami.
- Autor
- arjunprabhulal ↗
- Repozytorium
- devops-skills ↗
- Licencja
- MIT
- Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
- 25.08.2026
Ocena i bezpieczeństwo
- Pliki w paczce
- 1
- Skrypty
- 0
- Komentarze HTML
- 0
- Adresy URL w SKILL.md
- 0
Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 25.08.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.
MIT, otwarta: można używać i zmieniać, z zachowaniem informacji o autorze.
Co robi i kiedy
Znajduje, priorytetyzuje i zamyka podatności w kodzie, zależnościach, obrazach i infrastrukturze, bez zalewania zespołu nieprzydatnymi alertami.
Oryginalny opis (EN)
Finds, prioritizes, and closes out vulnerabilities across code, dependencies, images, and infrastructure without drowning the team in unactionable findings. Use this whenever the user is deciding what to patch first, has a scanner producing hundreds of CVEs, is setting patch SLAs, is asking whether a vulnerability is actually exploitable, or is building a remediation process. For the scanners that produce these findings use `security-scanning`; for trusting the artifacts you patch use `supply-chain-security`.
Jak działa
- 1. Scan everywhere, but don't treat every scan the same
- 2. Prioritize by exploitability and reachability, not raw CVSS
- 3. Set patch SLAs by severity tier, and hold to them
- 4. Give the team a fix, not just a finding
- 5. Suppress deliberately, not by ignoring
- Report
Podgląd SKILL.md
--- name: vulnerability-management description: Finds, prioritizes, and closes out vulnerabilities across code, dependencies, images, and infrastructure without drowning the team in unactionable findings. Use this whenever the user is deciding what to patch first, has a scanner producing hundreds of CVEs, is setting patch SLAs, is asking whether a vulnerability is actually exploitable, or is building a remediation process. For the scanners that produce these findings use `security-scanning`; for trusting the artifacts you patch use `supply-chain-security`. license: MIT --- # Vulnerability Management A raw scanner report is a list of theoretical problems, not a work plan. Every base image pulls in hundreds of CVEs, most in code paths nobody calls, in packages exposed to nothing, behind network boundaries that block the exploit. Treating every CVE as equally urgent trains the team to ignore the report entirely, which is worse than not scanning at all. The job is triage, not enumeration. A finding earns attention by being both exploitable and reachable — not by having a high CVSS score in isolation. **A vulnerability nobody can reach is a lower priority than a medium-severity one sitting on your public ingress.** ## 1. Scan everywhere, but don't treat every scan the same Code, dependencies, container images, IaC, and running infrastructure each need coverage, and each surfaces different risk. A dependency CVE in a library you don't call is different from a misconfigured security group actively exposing a database. Route each scan type to its own queue with its own triage rules instead of one undifferentiated backlog. The scanning tools themselves — SAST, dependency, image — belong to `security-scanning`; this skill is about what happens to what they find. **Done when:** every asset class (code, deps, images, infra) has an owner for its findings queue. ## 2. Prioritize by exploitability and reachability, not raw CVSS CVSS measures theoretical severity assuming the vulnerable code path is reachable and unmitigated — it says nothing about your actual deployment. A critical CVE in a function your code never calls is lower priority than a medium CVE in your internet-facing auth path. | Signal | Raises priority | Lowers priority | |---|---|---| | Reachability | Vulnerable function is on a call path from user input | Package installed but code path unused | | Exposure | Internet-facing, no auth | Internal-only, behind mTLS | | Known exploitation | Actively exploited in the wild (KEV-listed) | No known public exploit | | Compensating control | None | WAF rule or network policy already blocks the vector | Use reachability analysis or SCA tooling that traces call graphs where available — it turns a 400-CVE report into a 12-item list. **Done when:** the top of the remediation queue is sorted by exploitability and exposure, not by CVSS number alone. ## 3. Set patch SLAs by severity tier, and hold to them An SLA without enforcement is a suggestion. Tie tiers to the triage from step 2, not to raw scanner severity, so the SLA clock only starts once something is actually confirmed exploitable and reachable. Track SLA breaches visibly — a dashboard the team ignores is not a control, it's decoration. - **Critical + actively exploited**: patch or mitigate within a day, page if missed. - **High + reachable**: patch within the sprint. - **Everything else**: batch into normal dependency-update cadence. **Done when:** every open finding has an SLA clock attached and a named owner. ## 4. Give the team a fix, not just a finding "Upgrade log4j" is more actionable than "CVE-2021-44228 detected." Where possible, the report should include the target version, whether it's a drop-in upgrade or a breaking change, and a compensating control if the fix isn't immediate. Findings without a clear next action rot in the backlog and erode trust in the whole program. **Done when:** a developer can act on a finding without first researching what the CVE means. ## 5. Suppress deliberately, not by ignoring Some findings are accepted risk — no fix exists, the path is unreachable, a compensating control covers it. Suppress those explicitly with a reason and a review date, rather than letting them sit unacknowledged. An unreviewed suppression list is how a real exploitable finding hides in noise for a year. - **Time-box every suppression** and revisit it, since "unreachable today" can become reachable after a refactor. **Done when:** every suppressed finding has a documented reason and an expiry for re-review. ## Report State the current open-finding count by severity tier, the SLA for each tier, and how many are currently past SLA. Name the class of finding still triaged by raw CVSS alone rather than reachability — that's where the noise is still winning, and admitting it is more useful than a clean-looking dashboard.
Wersje
| Repozytorium | Wynik | Licencja |
|---|---|---|
| Ta strona · arjunprabhulal/devops-skills | 90 | MIT |
| redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills | 100 | Apache-2.0 |
| chrishuffman5/domain-expert | 90 | MIT |
Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki fe6ded8fe043 (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)
Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking
Zgłoś problem z tym skillem: szkodliwa treść, błędny opis albo prośba autora o usunięcie.
Podobne skille
- 98performing-endpoint-vulnerability-remediation
Usuwa podatności na endpointach: priorytetyzuje CVE według ryzyka, wdraża poprawki i zmiany konfiguracji, a potem sprawdza ich skuteczność. - 90vulnerability-validation
Sprawdza, czy podejrzane podatności są osiągalne i realnie groźne, na podstawie artefaktów wyników skanów przed poprawką. - 100vulnerability-scanner
Analizuje podatności wg OWASP 2025, bezpieczeństwo łańcucha dostaw i powierzchnię ataku, a potem ustala priorytety ryzyka. - 100scanning-for-vulnerabilities
Skanuje kod, zależności i konfiguracje pod kątem podatności, w tym CVE, przez plugin vulnerability-scanner. - 100scanning-for-vulnerabilities
Skanuje kod, zależności i konfiguracje pod kątem podatności, w tym CVE, przez plugin vulnerability-scanner. - 100threat-patch
Naprawia ustalenia bezpieczeństwa minimalnymi, precyzyjnymi poprawkami kodu na podstawie findings.json, THREAT-MODEL.md, raportu CSV skanera lub opisów podatności.