security-detection
/security-detection
Wykrywa zmiany w plikach infrastrukturalnych i krytycznych dla bezpieczeństwa, by zlecić przegląd agentowi bezpieczeństwa.
- Autor
- rjmurillo ↗
- Repozytorium
- ai-agents ↗
- Licencja
- MIT
- Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
- 12.11.2026
Ocena i bezpieczeństwo
- Pliki w paczce
- 2
- Skrypty
- 1
- Komentarze HTML
- 1
- Adresy URL w SKILL.md
- 0
Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 12.11.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.
MIT, otwarta: można używać i zmieniać, z zachowaniem informacji o autorze.
- 1 skrypt w paczce. Przejrzyj je przed instalacją, bo Claude może je uruchomić.
- SKILL.md zawiera komentarze HTML (1). Nie widać ich w podglądzie Markdown, a model je czyta.
Skrypty: detect_infrastructure.py
Co robi i kiedy
Wykrywa zmiany w plikach infrastrukturalnych i krytycznych dla bezpieczeństwa, by zlecić przegląd agentowi bezpieczeństwa.
Wyzwalacze z opisu
Oryginalny opis (EN)
Detect infrastructure and security-critical file changes to trigger security agent review recommendations ensuring proper security oversight for sensitive modifications. Use when you ask "did I touch security-critical files", "should the security agent review this". Detection only. Do NOT use to scan source for injection patterns (use security-scan).
Jak działa
- Triggers
- When to Use
- Available Scripts
- Usage
- Output
- Risk Levels
- Detected Patterns
- Integration
- Exit Codes
- Customization
Podgląd SKILL.md
---
name: security-detection
description: Detect infrastructure and security-critical file changes to trigger security agent review recommendations ensuring proper security oversight for sensitive modifications. Use when you ask "did I touch security-critical files", "should the security agent review this". Detection only. Do NOT use to scan source for injection patterns (use security-scan).
license: MIT
metadata:
routing:
role: front-door
invoker: autoplan
trigger: autoplan routes did-I-touch-security-critical-files questions to security-detection
user-facing: false
version: 1.0.0
model: haiku
model-rationale: cost. The 'haiku' rolling alias resolves via the platform model_tiers map to a tier priced below the sonnet-tier harness default; this unit is routing/mechanical work where the cheaper tier suffices (ADR-080 rule 3).
---
# Security Detection Utility
## Triggers
| Trigger Phrase | Operation |
|----------------|-----------|
| `scan for security changes` | detect-infrastructure with staged files |
| `check security-critical files` | detect-infrastructure with file list |
| `run security scan on changes` | detect-infrastructure analysis |
| `do I need a security review` | Risk-level assessment of changed files |
| `check infrastructure changes` | Pattern matching against critical/high lists |
---
## When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Committing changes that may touch infrastructure or security files
- Pre-commit validation for security-sensitive paths
- Determining if a security agent review is needed
- CI pipeline security gate checks
Use the security agent directly instead when:
- You already know security review is needed
- Performing threat modeling or vulnerability assessment
- Reviewing authentication or authorization code in depth
---
## Available Scripts
| Script | Language | Usage |
|--------|----------|-------|
| `detect_infrastructure.py` | Python 3 | Cross-platform |
## Usage
```bash
# Analyze staged files
python detect_infrastructure.py --use-git-staged
# Analyze specific files
python detect_infrastructure.py --files .github/workflows/ci.yml src/auth/login.cs
```
## Output
**Delegation on each host.** "Delegate to the `X` agent" means the host's subagent tool: Claude Code `Task` with `subagent_type="X"`; Copilot CLI `task` with `agent_type="project-toolkit:X"`; Codex `spawn_agent` with `agent_type="X"`, plus `fork_turns="none"` when the agent reviews or judges work (the default hands it your whole history); Muse Code `subagent_spawn` with `role="X"` and an `objective`, plus `worktree_isolation: true` for an agent that writes files. If the host has no subagent tool, or no `X` agent is installed, run the step yourself in this session.
When security-critical files are detected:
```text
=== Security Review Detection ===
CRITICAL: Security agent review REQUIRED
Matching files:
[CRITICAL] .github/workflows/deploy.yml
[HIGH] src/Controllers/AuthController.cs
Run security agent before implementation:
Delegate to the security agent: "Review infrastructure changes"
(Claude Code: Task with subagent_type="security"; Copilot CLI: task with
agent_type="project-toolkit:security"; Codex: spawn_agent with
agent_type="security"; Muse Code: subagent_spawn with role="security")
```
When no matches:
```text
No infrastructure/security files detected.
```
## Risk Levels
| Level | Meaning | Action |
|-------|---------|--------|
| CRITICAL | Immediate security implications | Review REQUIRED |
| HIGH | Potential security impact | Review RECOMMENDED |
## Detected Patterns
### Critical (Review Required)
- CI/CD workflows (`.github/workflows/*`)
- Git hook configuration (`{lefthook,.lefthook,lefthook-local,.lefthook-local}.{yml,yaml,json,jsonc,toml}`, `.config/{lefthook,lefthook-local}.{yml,yaml,json,jsonc,toml}`, `.husky/*`)
- Git hook policy (`scripts/validation/git_hook_policy.py`)
- Authentication code (`**/Auth/**`, `**/Security/**`)
- Environment files (`*.env*`)
- Credentials and keys (`*.pem`, `*.key`, `*secret*`)
### High (Review Recommended)
- Build scripts (`build/**/*.ps1`, `scripts/**/*.sh`)
- Container configs (`Dockerfile*`, `docker-compose*`)
- API controllers (`**/Controllers/**`)
- App configuration (`appsettings*.json`)
- Infrastructure as Code (`*.tf`, `*.tfvars`, `*.bicep`)
## Integration
### Pre-commit Hook
Add a named validator job to `lefthook.yml`:
```bash
# Security detection (non-blocking warning)
( for d in "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}" "${COPILOT_PLUGIN_ROOT}" .claude; do if [ -n "$d" ] && [ -f "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" ]; then exec python3 "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" skills/security-detection/detect_infrastructure.py --use-git-staged; fi; done; echo "ptk_run: no plugin root holds lib/ptk_run.py" >&2; exit 2 )
```
### CI Integration
On a Linux pull-request runner, pass the changed paths explicitly. CI checkouts
do not have a staged diff.
```yaml
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check security-critical files
shell: bash
env:
BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
run: >-
git diff --no-renames --name-only -z "$BASE_SHA" "$HEAD_SHA"
| ( for d in "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}" "${COPILOT_PLUGIN_ROOT}" .claude; do if [ -n "$d" ] && [ -f "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" ]; then exec python3 "$d/lib/ptk_run.py" skills/security-detection/detect_infrastructure.py --files-from-stdin; fi; done; echo "ptk_run: no plugin root holds lib/ptk_run.py" >&2; exit 2 )
```
## Exit Codes
| Code | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| 0 | Detection finished. Matches print a warning that does not block. With `--require-security-review`, also: no CRITICAL file, or every CRITICAL file has a valid security review marker. |
| 1 | `--require-security-review` is set and a CRITICAL file has no valid marker on the ref (BLOCKED). |
| 3 | `--require-security-review` is set and git could not answer while reading the staged index or the review marker (git missing, timed out, exited non-zero, returned undecodable output, or rejected the ref) (BLOCKED). An unanswered check never counts as a marker. |
Without `--require-security-review` the scripts always exit 0, so advisory use
in commits and CI stays non-blocking. The warning is informational only. Only
the flag turns a CRITICAL finding or a failed git read into a blocking exit.
## Customization
Edit the pattern lists in either script to add or modify detection patterns:
- `CRITICAL_PATTERNS` / `$CriticalPatterns` - Review required
- `HIGH_PATTERNS` / `$HighPatterns` - Review recommended
## Process
1. Gather the list of changed files (staged or explicit)
2. Run pattern matching against critical and high-risk file patterns
3. Report findings with risk level classification
4. Route to security agent if CRITICAL matches found
## Anti-Patterns
| Avoid | Why | Instead |
|-------|-----|---------|
| Skipping detection before commits | Security files slip through unreviewed | Run detection on every commit with infrastructure changes |
| Treating warnings as blocking | Scripts exit 0 intentionally | Use output to inform review decisions, not block commits |
| Hardcoding custom patterns inline | Drifts from canonical pattern lists | Edit CRITICAL_PATTERNS/HIGH_PATTERNS in the scripts |
| Ignoring HIGH-level matches | Potential security impact overlooked | Review HIGH matches, escalate to security agent when uncertain |
| Running only one language script | May miss platform-specific detection | Use whichever script matches your environment |
---
## Verification
After running security detection:
- [ ] Script exited with code 0, or with 1 or 3 only under `--require-security-review` (blocked)
- [ ] All CRITICAL matches reviewed
- [ ] Security agent routed for CRITICAL findings
- [ ] HIGH matches evaluated for review need
- [ ] Output captured in session log if security-relevant
---
## Related Documents
Backticked paths below are in the `rjmurillo/ai-agents` repository. They do not ship with this skill; a consumer install cannot resolve them.
- `.project-toolkit/security/infrastructure-file-patterns.md`. Infrastructure file patterns.
- `.project-toolkit/security/static-analysis-checklist.md`. Security agent capabilities.
- `docs/orchestrator-routing-algorithm.md`. Orchestrator routing algorithm.
<!-- vendor-portability: declared. This skill cites .project-toolkit/security/infrastructure-file-patterns.md, .project-toolkit/security/static-analysis-checklist.md, and docs/orchestrator-routing-algorithm.md as background reading. All three are citations only; the detection patterns documented here are self-contained, so a vendored install loses the further reading, not the capability. -->
Pliki w paczce (2)
- SKILL.md 9 KB
- detect_infrastructure.py 37 KB
Wersje
| Repozytorium | Wynik | Licencja |
|---|---|---|
| Ta strona · rjmurillo/ai-agents | 100 | MIT |
| rjmurillo/ai-agents | 100 | MIT |
| rjmurillo/ai-agents | 100 | MIT |
Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki 3204134dad68 (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)
Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking
Zgłoś problem z tym skillem: szkodliwa treść, błędny opis albo prośba autora o usunięcie.
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