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Biblioteka skilli
Bezpieczeństwo · Przegląd i audyt

security-agent-guard

/security-agent-guard

Przegląda kod z LLM i agentami pod kątem iniekcji promptów, nadmiernych uprawnień i wycieków w RAG, wskazując plik i linię.

Repozytorium
vibe.md ↗
Licencja
MIT
Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
13.11.2026

Ocena i bezpieczeństwo

100/ 100Klasa: dobry
Format25 / 25
Frontmatter z nazwą i opisem, poprawna nazwa, opis do 1024 znaków, nazwa zgodna z folderem.
Odkrywalność25 / 25
Opis mówi, kiedy użyć skilla, ma sensowną długość i jest w 3. osobie.
Treść35 / 35
Co najmniej 150 słów i do 500 linii, nagłówki, listy kroków, przykłady albo kod.
Higiena15 / 15
Bez zaślepek typu TODO, bez ścieżek Windows, z licencją.
Ryzykobrak sygnałów w skanie
Pliki w paczce
7
Skrypty
0
Komentarze HTML
0
Adresy URL w SKILL.md
0
Przestarzałość

Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 13.11.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.

Licencja

MIT, otwarta: można używać i zmieniać, z zachowaniem informacji o autorze.

Co robi i kiedy

Przegląda kod z LLM i agentami pod kątem iniekcji promptów, nadmiernych uprawnień i wycieków w RAG, wskazując plik i linię.

Oryginalny opis (EN)

Reviews code that uses LLMs or AI agents for AI-specific security risks - prompt injection, excessive agent permissions, unsafe tool calls, cross-user data leaks in retrieval (RAG), secrets or personal data in prompts, and unsafe use of model output. Reports evidence-based findings with file and line, severity, certainty, and a fix. Use when the user asks to review the security of an AI feature, chatbot, agent, tool integration, or RAG pipeline. Not for general code security or committed secrets.

Jak działa

  1. Purpose
  2. When to Use
  3. Prerequisites
  4. Instructions
  5. Report format
  6. Examples
Sekcje z nagłówków SKILL.md, w oryginale · 71 linii, 807 słów
Podgląd SKILL.md
---
name: security-agent-guard
description: Reviews code that uses LLMs or AI agents for AI-specific security risks - prompt injection, excessive agent permissions, unsafe tool calls, cross-user data leaks in retrieval (RAG), secrets or personal data in prompts, and unsafe use of model output. Reports evidence-based findings with file and line, severity, certainty, and a fix. Use when the user asks to review the security of an AI feature, chatbot, agent, tool integration, or RAG pipeline. Not for general code security or committed secrets.
license: MIT
compatibility: Read-only. Needs access to the source code. Works with any language or framework; examples use Python and JavaScript.
metadata:
  collection: vibe.md
  group: security
  author: NoaGaler
---

# AgentGuard: AI application security review

## Purpose

Find security problems that exist because an application uses a language model: the model reads untrusted text, chooses actions, calls tools, retrieves data, and produces output that other code trusts. Report only what the code shows, explain why it matters, and suggest a fix the developer can apply.

## When to Use

- The user asks whether an AI feature, chatbot, agent, or RAG pipeline is secure.
- The user asks for a security review of code that calls a model API, defines tools for a model, or builds prompts.
- The user asks about prompt injection, agent permissions, or data leaks through an AI feature.

Do not use this skill:

- to review code that does not use a model. Use `pre-commit-security-review` if it is installed.
- to find secrets committed to the repository. Use `secret-guard` if it is installed.
- to build or change an AI feature. This skill only reviews.

## Prerequisites

- Read access to the source code.
- No tools, accounts, or network access are required.
- Permissions: read-only. The skill reads files and, when available, runs `git status` and `git diff` to find changes. It never edits, deletes, commits, or runs project code.

## Instructions

1. **Set the scope.** Review what the user named. If they named nothing, review the current changes (`git diff --staged`, then `git diff`, plus new untracked files). If they ask for the whole project, start with files that use a model and say which files you did not reach.
2. **Find the model calls.** Search the scope for model SDKs and APIs, prompt templates, tool or function definitions, agent frameworks, MCP servers, and vector stores. If there are none, say so and stop: this skill does not apply.
3. **Map each AI feature.** For each model call or agent loop, write down:
   - **sources:** where text enters the prompt, and which of it is untrusted;
   - **capabilities:** tools the model can call and data it can see;
   - **sinks:** where the output and tool arguments end up.
4. **Load only the references that apply.**
   - Untrusted text reaches a prompt: [prompt injection](references/prompt-injection.md).
   - The model has tools or acts on its own: [excessive agency](references/excessive-agency.md) and [tool calling](references/tool-calling.md).
   - The code retrieves documents or embeddings into prompts: [RAG security](references/rag-security.md).
   - Prompts contain configuration or user data, or conversations are stored: [sensitive information](references/sensitive-information.md).
   - Output is used for anything other than plain text shown to the same user: [output handling](references/output-handling.md).
5. **Trace each path from source to sink.** Apply the "When it is a finding" and "When it is not a finding" rules in the reference. A finding needs a location in the code for every part of its path.
6. **Separate certainty from suspicion.** Mark each finding **confirmed** when the whole path is in code you read, or **suspected** when part of it is in code you could not read, and say which part and how to check it. Never present a suspicion as fact.
7. **Do not report** generic advice, missing best practices without a path to harm, or risks in code outside the scope. Do not print secret values.
8. **Write the report** in the format below, highest severity first.
9. **Do not change code** unless the user asks. If they ask, fix one finding at a time and show the change.

## Report format

For each finding:

- **Where:** file and line for each part of the path.
- **What:** the problem in one sentence, with the risk name.
- **Why it matters:** a concrete misuse, such as the input that would cause it.
- **Severity:** high, medium, or low, with a one-line reason.
- **Certainty:** confirmed or suspected.
- **Fix:** the change to make, and why it is stronger than the alternatives.

End with:

- **Coverage:** which AI features and which risk areas were checked, and which were skipped as not applicable. A clean result covers only what was checked.
- **Out of scope:** issues noticed that belong to other reviews, such as general web security or committed secrets, in one line each.

## Examples

**User:** "Is my support chatbot secure? The code is in `support/`."

**Agent:** Finds the model call and its tools in `support/`, maps sources (customer messages, order records), capabilities (`lookup_order`, `issue_refund`), and sinks (the reply shown in the staff dashboard). Loads the prompt injection, excessive agency, tool calling, and output handling references. Reports that `issue_refund` runs without confirmation for any amount the model provides (high, confirmed), and that replies are inserted with `innerHTML` in the dashboard (high, confirmed). Lists RAG as not applicable.

**User:** "Review my changes before I commit."

**Agent:** Reads the diff. The changes touch only CSS and a date helper, with no model calls. Says that this skill does not apply and suggests a general security review instead.
Pliki w paczce (7)
  • SKILL.md 6 KB
  • references/excessive-agency.md 4 KB
  • references/output-handling.md 4 KB
  • references/prompt-injection.md 4 KB
  • references/rag-security.md 4 KB
  • references/sensitive-information.md 4 KB
  • references/tool-calling.md 4 KB

Wersje

W bazie nie ma innych skilli o nazwie security-agent-guard.

Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki 551f7c4ff06e (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)

Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking

Zgłoś problem z tym skillem: szkodliwa treść, błędny opis albo prośba autora o usunięcie.

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Uwagi i zgłoszenia

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