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Bezpieczeństwo · Przegląd i audyt

release-malware-audit

/release-malware-audit

Skanuje własny projekt pod kątem złośliwego kodu przed wydaniem i zwraca werdykt zaliczenia albo blokady.

Repozytorium
whetstorm-art ↗
Licencja
MIT
Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
25.10.2026

Ocena i bezpieczeństwo

100/ 100Klasa: dobry
Format25 / 25
Frontmatter z nazwą i opisem, poprawna nazwa, opis do 1024 znaków, nazwa zgodna z folderem.
Odkrywalność25 / 25
Opis mówi, kiedy użyć skilla, ma sensowną długość i jest w 3. osobie.
Treść35 / 35
Co najmniej 150 słów i do 500 linii, nagłówki, listy kroków, przykłady albo kod.
Higiena15 / 15
Bez zaślepek typu TODO, bez ścieżek Windows, z licencją.
Ryzykobrak sygnałów w skanie
Pliki w paczce
1
Skrypty
0
Komentarze HTML
0
Adresy URL w SKILL.md
0
Przestarzałość

Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 25.10.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.

Licencja

MIT, otwarta: można używać i zmieniać, z zachowaniem informacji o autorze.

Co robi i kiedy

Skanuje własny projekt pod kątem złośliwego kodu przed wydaniem i zwraca werdykt zaliczenia albo blokady.

Oryginalny opis (EN)

Release-gate scan for deliberately planted malicious code (crypto miners, data/secret exfiltration, backdoors, RCE/obfuscation, install hooks) across the whole working tree of World of ClaudeCraft. Use before tagging or shipping a release, or whenever you want to confirm the tree is free of malicious code. Runs the deterministic scanner, fans the read-only release-malware-audit agent across categories, and returns a single PASS / BLOCK verdict with confirmed findings and dismissed false positives. Distinct from privacy-security-review, which catches accidental security mistakes.

Jak działa

  1. Steps
  2. What is in scope (and the seams it deliberately covers)
  3. Scope and limits (say these in the report, do not pretend otherwise)
  4. Relationship to the other reviewers
Sekcje z nagłówków SKILL.md, w oryginale · 87 linii, 781 słów
Podgląd SKILL.md
---
name: release-malware-audit
description: Release-gate scan for deliberately planted malicious code (crypto miners, data/secret exfiltration, backdoors, RCE/obfuscation, install hooks) across the whole working tree of World of ClaudeCraft. Use before tagging or shipping a release, or whenever you want to confirm the tree is free of malicious code. Runs the deterministic scanner, fans the read-only release-malware-audit agent across categories, and returns a single PASS / BLOCK verdict with confirmed findings and dismissed false positives. Distinct from privacy-security-review, which catches accidental security mistakes.
user-invocable: true
---

# Release malware audit: whole-tree check for planted malicious code

This is a release gate. Its one job is to answer: **does this tree contain code that was
deliberately written to harm users, operators, or the supply chain?** Crypto miners,
data/secret exfiltration, backdoors and auth bypasses, RCE/obfuscation, web3 wallet-drain /
key theft (the class that would steal a user's `$WOC`), prompt-injection planted in the
agent/skill instruction files, and `package.json` install hooks or risky dependencies. It
does NOT look for accidental security bugs - that is `privacy-security-review`'s job - and it
never modifies code. A human acts on a BLOCK.

The work is split so each half does what it is good at:
- **`scripts/malware_scan.mjs`** is a deterministic, high-recall FLAGGER. It greps a curated
  signature catalog and emits structured findings. It is deliberately noisy: a regex hit is
  a question, not a verdict.
- **The `release-malware-audit` agent** is the JUDGE. It reads the flagged code in context,
  knows this repo's legitimate patterns (the `$WOC` crypto-wallet, `child_process` in build
  scripts, real auth comparisons), and decides real-vs-false-positive.

## Steps

1. **Run the scanner** over the whole tree:

   ```
   mkdir -p tmp && node scripts/malware_scan.mjs --json --quiet > tmp/malware_scan.json
   ```

   It exits non-zero whenever there are findings (expected; most are false positives). Note
   `totalFindings` and the per-category counts. A scan-failure exit (`2`) means fix the run
   before trusting any result - never report PASS off a scan that did not complete.

   `npm run security:scan` is the same human-readable flagger. CI and `npm run security:gate`
   run `--gate`, which exits non-zero only on a HIGH-severity finding that survives the
   path-aware priors (`tests/malware_scan.test.ts` asserts the tree is HIGH-clean, so a planted
   signature breaks `npm test`). This skill is the deeper, agent-judged pass on top of that.

2. **Triage by fanning out the agent.** Group the findings by `category`. Dispatch the
   read-only `release-malware-audit` agent, one invocation per category that has findings
   (categories are independent, so run them in parallel in a single message). Give each
   agent its category's findings (or point it at `tmp/malware_scan.json` and the category)
   and have it read the flagged files and return confirmed-vs-dismissed for that category.
   For a small number of total findings, a single agent invocation over all of them is fine.

3. **Synthesize one verdict.** Combine the agents' results into a single report:

   - **PASS** only if every flag is explained by legitimate behavior.
   - **BLOCK** if there is even one confirmed malicious finding, or an uncertain finding that
     cannot be cleared. The gate fails safe: when in doubt, BLOCK and explain.

   Report confirmed findings (`file:line`, category, why), uncertain findings needing human
   judgement, and a one-line dismissal summary per category so a human can spot-check. Never
   silently drop a flag.

## What is in scope (and the seams it deliberately covers)

- **Whole source tree**, including instruction markdown that an LLM executes:
  `.claude/agents/**`, `.claude/skills/**`, `CLAUDE.md`, and `AGENTS.md` are scanned for
  prompt injection / exfiltration / permission-escalation directives. Prose docs (`docs/**`,
  `README.md`) are out of scope - they are not executed. `.env` is never read.
- **`package.json` content check**: install lifecycle hooks and newly-added
  transaction/web3/miner or non-registry (git/url/tarball) dependencies.
- **Path-aware priors**: `child_process`/`exec` in `scripts/`, `headless/`, and `tests/` is
  dev tooling and demoted below the gate threshold, so the HIGH band tracks real risk in
  shipped `src/**` and `server/**`. A `--gate` run (and `npm test`) fails only on a surviving
  HIGH finding, so a clean tree is green and a planted drainer is not.

## Scope and limits (say these in the report, do not pretend otherwise)

- **The static line scan cannot see**: aliased or multi-line or dynamically-built call forms
  (e.g. `const f = fetch; f(url, {body: secret})`), an exfil URL assembled from variables or
  fetched at runtime, semantically paraphrased instruction injection (the `ai-*` rules catch
  phrasings, not meaning), and anything behind `eval`/runtime indirection. The agent
  compensates by READING context, but neither runs the code in a sandbox - say so.
- **Dependencies are checked by content, not by diff or depth.** `node_modules` is NOT walked
  and the lockfile's transitive tree is NOT audited. The manifest check catches a direct risky
  or non-registry dep and install hooks, but a malicious TRANSITIVE dependency, or a
  compromised version of an allowed one, is invisible here. The realistic token-theft path is
  new wallet-transaction code (which the `web3`/`key-exfil` rules cover) or a new dependency -
  pair this gate with `npm audit`, a lockfile diff, and a review of any `package.json` change.
- **Read-only.** This skill never edits, reverts, or quarantines code. It produces a verdict;
  remediation is a human decision.

## Relationship to the other reviewers

This skill owns deliberately planted malicious code; `privacy-security-review` owns accidental
security and privacy mistakes. The full reviewer map lives in `docs/qa-gate.md`.

Wersje

W bazie nie ma innych skilli o nazwie release-malware-audit.

Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki 7b974765bf17 (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)

Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking

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Uwagi i zgłoszenia

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