proactive-defense
/proactive-defense
Planuje i prowadzi uprawnione działania obronne: kontrole bezpieczeństwa biznesu, przegląd logów, patrole, obsługę alertów i reagowanie na incydenty.
Ocena i bezpieczeństwo
- Pliki w paczce
- 1
- Skrypty
- 0
- Komentarze HTML
- 0
- Adresy URL w SKILL.md
- 0
Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 12.11.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.
GPL-3.0, otwarta.
Co robi i kiedy
Planuje i prowadzi uprawnione działania obronne: kontrole bezpieczeństwa biznesu, przegląd logów, patrole, obsługę alertów i reagowanie na incydenty.
Oryginalny opis (EN)
Plans and executes authorized defensive security operations: business security checks, log review, attack-surface baselines, patrols, alert triage, incident response, and attack tracing. Use when the user asks for 主动防御、业务安全检查、日志检查、安全巡检、告警处置、攻击溯源 or equivalent defensive work.
Jak działa
- Phase 0 — Intent intake (mandatory first)
- Phase 0b — When intent is vague: auto-discover, then propose
- Phase 1 — Coverage matrix + KB playbook
- Phase 2 — Collect evidence
- Execution cadence — do not default to Cron
- Phase 3 — Optional cron patrol
- Phase 4 — Report
- Safety (never skip)
Podgląd SKILL.md
--- name: proactive-defense description: "Plans and executes authorized defensive security operations: business security checks, log review, attack-surface baselines, patrols, alert triage, incident response, and attack tracing. Use when the user asks for 主动防御、业务安全检查、日志检查、安全巡检、告警处置、攻击溯源 or equivalent defensive work." inject-priority: 9 trigger-keywords: - "\\b(proactive defense|defensive security|attack surface|security patrol|log review|alert triage|incident response|threat hunting|attack tracing|hardening)\\b" - "主动防御|业务安全|日志检查|日志审计|攻击面|安全巡检|告警处置|应急响应|威胁狩猎|攻击溯源|加固|暴露面" trigger-tools: - local_attack_surface_snapshot - network_profile_host - network_assess_exposure - cron_list - cron_runs - cron_upsert - kb_search - kb_save - kb_read - case_create - artifact_add --- # Proactive Defense When the user asks for defensive work, **lead the workflow** but ground it in their business objective, authorized assets, available logs, and desired operating cadence. This is an Agent capability, not a session mode or UI state. Default posture: **non-destructive**, read-only collection + recommendations. No exploit verification, persistence, or destructive hardening unless the user opens a separate offensive engagement. ## Phase 0 — Intent intake (mandatory first) **Do not** dive into deep scans, SSH, or `cron_upsert` until Phase 0 is done (except tiny, free discovery that helps you ask better questions — see Phase 0b). Ask clearly (one short decision card / few questions; Chinese if the user writes Chinese): 1. **目标是什么?** 本机加固 / 内网主机 / 云主机 / Web 对外暴露 / 办公网 / 全部? 2. **资产范围?** IP/CIDR、域名、URL、SSH Host、本机。哪些**明确授权**、哪些禁止碰? 3. **期望产出?** 一次性报告 / 基线对比 / 持续巡检告警 / 加固清单 / 事件时间线 / 攻击溯源报告? 4. **巡检怎么跑?** 要不要定时?频率(每小时 / 每天 / 每周)?有变化才通知还是每次摘要?安静时段? 5. **远程怎么采?** 仅外网探测(network_*) / 已配 SSH(`~/.ssh/config` / agent) / 暂不远程? 6. **可用证据?** Web/业务日志、WAF/EDR/SIEM 告警、代理流量、主机审计、云审计或已有 Case。 7. **敏感边界?** 生产 vs 测试、可否轻量端口扫描、是否允许 `create_scan`、禁止操作清单。 If the user already answered these in the message, profile, Case, or KB playbook, **do not re-ask** — confirm in one sentence and proceed. If answers are partial: ask only the missing critical items (scope + whether cron is wanted). Do not block forever on nice-to-haves. ## Phase 0b — When intent is vague: auto-discover, then propose If the user only says「帮我做主动防御 / 看看安全」without assets or goals: 1. **Actively gather context** (read-only, parallel where safe): - `user_profile_read` / habits; prior KB (`kb_search` / skill list) for playbooks or assets - Session todos / memory; linked cases or reverse/proxy context if any - `local_attack_surface_snapshot` for **this machine** (not for remotes) - Light env signals: hostname/OS from snapshot; running services of interest; toolchain / MCP health only if relevant - If URLs or hosts already appear in chat/history/proxy findings — treat as **candidates**, not confirmed scope 2. **Synthesize a written proposal** before heavy work: - Assumed business/system picture (what this host/role looks like) - Recommended coverage matrix (local / network / web / identity / supply-chain as applicable) - Suggested first-pass checks vs later deeper checks - Suggested patrol cadence + notify-on-diff vs one-shot - Explicit assumptions and **open questions** (what still needs user OK) 3. Present the proposal and wait for confirm / adjust **unless** the user already supplied scope and said「直接开始」— then execute the proposed first pass and note assumptions in the report. Never pretend remote Linux state came from the local sandbox (`ss`/`ufw` on ArgusAI host ≠ cloud VM). ## Phase 1 — Coverage matrix + KB playbook After intent (or accepted proposal): 1. `set_todos` / `add_todos`: layered matrix — business surface, logs/detections, local baseline, authorized remotes, web exposure, identity/edge, open questions. 2. `kb_save` a short **defense playbook** before deep collection: - Assets & out-of-scope - Goals & success criteria - Tool whitelist (read-only first) - Alert thresholds / what counts as “change” - Do-nots; skill refs (`proactive-defense`, `assistant-cron`, others) 3. Keep the playbook as the source of truth; cron prompts only **reference** the KB id. ## Phase 2 — Collect evidence | Target | Do | Don't | |--------|----|-------| | This machine | `local_attack_surface_snapshot` | Treat results as a remote host | | Remote, no SSH | `network_discover_hosts` / `network_profile_host` / `network_assess_exposure`; light `create_scan` only if authorized | Local `ss`/`ufw` claimed as remote | | Remote + authorized SSH | `shell_session_*` → `ssh` via agent/config; **read-only** cmds | Passwords in cron/prompt; restart/firewall writes on patrol ticks | | Business/Web | Proxy findings, authorized scan/task history, app/API evidence, auth and edge controls | Generic port output presented as business risk without mapping | | Logs/alerts | Focused time window, normalize entities, build timeline, correlate Case artifacts | Dump entire sensitive logs into chat or claim attribution without evidence | SSH read-only examples (skip if missing): listen ports, firewall summary, failed-login count, critical service versions. Summarize + `artifact_add`; no full dump in chat. Prefer tools: snapshot, `network_*`, `shell_session_*`, `kb_*`, `cron_*`, todos, `artifact_add` / case evidence when durable. For alert triage and attack tracing: create/reuse a Case, preserve raw references, correlate time/user/IP/process/request identifiers, separate observed facts from hypotheses, and state confidence plus evidence gaps. Do not claim actor identity from a single IOC. ## Execution cadence — do not default to Cron Choose the lightest mechanism that matches the requested duration: - **Immediate / one-off defense:** execute the inspection and response plan in the current Agent run. No Cron. - **Bounded rapid loop:** after a scan or action, use `wait_for_duration(seconds=1..300)` only when a real observation/settling interval is needed, then inspect again and continue. Set a concrete cycle count, deadline, success condition, or stop condition; do not turn short waits into an unbounded busy loop. - **Long-running OS process:** use the task-specific job/status tools or `shell_session_*` lifecycle when an actual scanner, watcher, or service must remain alive. The Agent should poll status rather than sleep blindly. - **Recurring / calendar / restart-resilient patrol:** use Cron only when the user wants work to wake again after the current run, at a future cadence, or after application restart. Multiple scan-and-verify steps do not by themselves justify creating a Cron job. A one-second wait followed by another authorized observation is normal Agent execution. ## Phase 3 — Optional cron patrol Only after the user wants recurring checks (or accepts that part of the proposal): 1. Playbook must exist in KB. 2. `cron_upsert`: `destination=new_session`, `tags=["defense"]`, `on_change_only=true` by default. 3. Thin prompt, e.g.「按 KB「kb-xxxx」执行;对比 cron_runs;无变化安静结束(summary: no change)」. 4. Freeze assets / `ssh_target` in `context_json`. Frequency matches user expectation (e.g. 3600 / 86400). 5. Teach ticks via `assistant-cron` skill; do not pack the full SOP into every prompt. 6. Count-bounded patrols use native `max_runs`. For an agreed outcome-based stop (e.g. stop after recovery is verified), write that condition into the playbook; the scheduled Agent calls `cron_set_enabled(enabled=false)` on its own job when it is met. Do not pause an ongoing patrol merely because a tick found no change. ## Phase 4 — Report - Exposure summary + risk hints + hardening suggestions prioritized - What was checked vs skipped (and why) - Baseline fingerprint / refs for next diff - If cron registered: job id, cadence, notify policy - Remaining questions for the user ## Safety (never skip) - Defensive workflows do **not** bypass confirmations, scope gates, or `NO_AUTO_APPROVE` - Missing authorization → mark todo blocked + ask; do not guess production OK - Prefer notify-on-diff for patrols; avoid noisy “all clear” spam - Cron ticks: low interaction; if blocked on missing info → notify once, do not stack decision cards
Wersje
W bazie nie ma innych skilli o nazwie proactive-defense.
Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki 0a567821b0fe (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)
Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking
Zgłoś problem z tym skillem: szkodliwa treść, błędny opis albo prośba autora o usunięcie.
Podobne skille
- 96incident-response-incident-response
Prawdopodobnie wspiera reagowanie na incydenty w systemach IT, na podstawie nazwy skilla. - 90incident-response
Wspiera reagowanie na incydenty bezpieczeństwa: podejrzane logi, wyciek kluczy i ocenę, czy dany ślad jest bezpieczny. - 100incident-response-planner
Pomaga zaplanować reagowanie na incydenty bezpieczeństwa, gdy ktoś prosi o plan reagowania na incydenty. - 100harden
Proponuje wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa kodu: nagłówki bezpieczeństwa, CSP, CORS, limity żądań, walidację wejścia, logowanie zdarzeń bezpieczeństwa i obronę warstwową. - 100defensive-security-analyst
Wspiera analizę bezpieczeństwa po stronie obrony: triaż alertów, analizę logów i SIEM, threat hunting, podstawy detekcji, mapowanie MITRE ATT&CK, zakres incydentu, zalecenia powstrzymania i obsługę dowodów DFIR dla analityków SOC. - 90msf-security
Prowadzi obronne modelowanie zagrożeń, audyty aplikacji i API, sprawdza autoryzację, zależności i kontenery w zakresie uprawnionym.