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Biblioteka skilli
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entry-point-analyzer

/entry-point-analyzer

Wyszukuje w kontraktach inteligentnych funkcje zmieniające stan i grupuje je według poziomu dostępu do audytu.

Repozytorium
skills ↗
Licencja
CC-BY-SA-4.0
Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
12.11.2026

Ocena i bezpieczeństwo

100/ 100Klasa: dobry
Format25 / 25
Frontmatter z nazwą i opisem, poprawna nazwa, opis do 1024 znaków, nazwa zgodna z folderem.
Odkrywalność25 / 25
Opis mówi, kiedy użyć skilla, ma sensowną długość i jest w 3. osobie.
Treść35 / 35
Co najmniej 150 słów i do 500 linii, nagłówki, listy kroków, przykłady albo kod.
Higiena15 / 15
Bez zaślepek typu TODO, bez ścieżek Windows, z licencją.
Ryzykobrak sygnałów w skanie
Pliki w paczce
10
Skrypty
0
Komentarze HTML
0
Adresy URL w SKILL.md
0
Przestarzałość

Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 12.11.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.

Licencja

CC-BY-SA-4.0, otwarta.

Co robi i kiedy

Wyszukuje w kontraktach inteligentnych funkcje zmieniające stan i grupuje je według poziomu dostępu do audytu.

Oryginalny opis (EN)

Analyzes smart contract codebases to identify state-changing entry points for security auditing. Detects externally callable functions that modify state, categorizes them by access level (public, admin, role-restricted, contract-only), and generates structured audit reports. Excludes view/pure/read-only functions. Use when auditing smart contracts (Solidity, Vyper, Solana/Rust, Move, TON, CosmWasm) or when asked to find entry points, audit flows, external functions, access control patterns, or privileged operations.

Jak działa

  1. Execution in Codex
  2. When to Use
  3. When NOT to Use
  4. Scope: State-Changing Functions Only
  5. Workflow
  6. Slither Integration (Solidity)
  7. Language Detection
  8. Access Classification
  9. Output Format
  10. Filtering
Sekcje z nagłówków SKILL.md, w oryginale · 261 linii, 1 367 słów
Podgląd SKILL.md
---
name: entry-point-analyzer
description: Analyzes smart contract codebases to identify state-changing entry points for security auditing. Detects externally callable functions that modify state, categorizes them by access level (public, admin, role-restricted, contract-only), and generates structured audit reports. Excludes view/pure/read-only functions. Use when auditing smart contracts (Solidity, Vyper, Solana/Rust, Move, TON, CosmWasm) or when asked to find entry points, audit flows, external functions, access control patterns, or privileged operations.
---

# Entry Point Analyzer

Systematically identify all **state-changing** entry points in a smart contract codebase to guide security audits.

## Execution in Codex

Use the available file-reading, search, and shell tools. Resolve bundled reference
links relative to this SKILL.md, not the audited repository. Slither is optional;
use manual inspection if it is unavailable or fails. Report unreadable source or
reference files as coverage gaps. Runtime permissions come from the workspace.

## When to Use

Use this skill when:
- Starting a smart contract security audit to map the attack surface
- Asked to find entry points, external functions, or audit flows
- Analyzing access control patterns across a codebase
- Identifying privileged operations and role-restricted functions
- Building an understanding of which functions can modify contract state

## When NOT to Use

Do NOT use this skill for:
- Vulnerability detection (use audit-context-building or domain-specific-audits)
- Writing exploit POCs (use solidity-poc-builder)
- Code quality or gas optimization analysis
- Non-smart-contract codebases
- Analyzing read-only functions (this skill excludes them)

## Scope: State-Changing Functions Only

This skill focuses exclusively on functions that can modify state. **Excluded:**

| Language | Excluded Patterns |
|----------|-------------------|
| Solidity | `view`, `pure` functions |
| Vyper | `@view`, `@pure` functions |
| Solana | Functions without `mut` account references |
| Move | Read-only function bodies; visibility alone does not establish mutability |
| TON | `get` methods (FunC), read-only receivers (Tact) |
| CosmWasm | `query` entry point and its handlers |

Include state-changing Move `public fun` even without `entry`: Aptos transaction
scripts and Sui programmable transaction blocks can reach them. Trace callees when
needed to determine state effects, and record signer, capability, and object
ownership requirements separately from visibility.

**Why exclude read-only functions?** They cannot directly cause loss of funds or state corruption. While they may leak information, the primary audit focus is on functions that can change state.

## Workflow

1. **Detect Language** - Identify contract language(s) from file extensions and syntax
2. **Use Tooling (if available)** - For Solidity, check if Slither is available and use it
3. **Locate Contracts** - Find all contract/module files (apply directory filter if specified)
4. **Extract Entry Points** - Parse each file for externally callable, state-changing functions
5. **Classify Access** - Categorize each function by access level
6. **Generate Report** - Output structured markdown report

## Slither Integration (Solidity)

For Solidity codebases, Slither can automatically extract entry points. Before manual analysis:

### 1. Check if Slither is Available

```bash
which slither
```

### 2. If Slither is Detected, Run Entry Points Printer

```bash
slither . --print entry-points
```

This outputs a table of all state-changing entry points with:
- Contract name
- Function name
- Visibility
- Modifiers applied

### 3. Use Slither Output as Foundation

- Parse the Slither output table to populate your analysis
- Cross-reference with manual inspection for access control classification
- Slither may miss some patterns (callbacks, dynamic access control)—supplement with manual review
- If Slither fails (compilation errors, unsupported features), fall back to manual analysis

### 4. When Slither is NOT Available

If `which slither` returns nothing, proceed with manual analysis using the language-specific reference files.

## Language Detection

| Extension | Language | Reference |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| `.sol` | Solidity | [references/solidity.md](references/solidity.md) |
| `.vy` | Vyper | [references/vyper.md](references/vyper.md) |
| `.rs` + `Cargo.toml` with `solana-program` | Solana (Rust) | [references/solana.md](references/solana.md) |
| `.move` + `Move.toml` with `edition` | Move (Sui) | [references/move-sui.md](references/move-sui.md) |
| `.move` + `Move.toml` with `Aptos` | Move (Aptos) | [references/move-aptos.md](references/move-aptos.md) |
| `.fc`, `.func`, `.tact` | TON (FunC/Tact) | [references/ton.md](references/ton.md) |
| `.rs` + `Cargo.toml` with `cosmwasm-std` | CosmWasm | [references/cosmwasm.md](references/cosmwasm.md) |

Load the appropriate reference file(s) based on detected language before analysis.

## Access Classification

Classify each state-changing entry point into one of these categories:

### 1. Public (Unrestricted)
Functions with no caller-identity or role restriction. Record state conditions such as pause
flags separately; they do not make a function privileged.

### 2. Role-Restricted
Functions limited to specific roles. Common patterns to detect:
- Explicit role names: `admin`, `owner`, `governance`, `guardian`, `operator`, `manager`, `minter`, `pauser`, `keeper`, `relayer`, `lender`, `borrower`
- Role-checking patterns: `onlyRole`, `hasRole`, `require(msg.sender == X)`, `assert_owner`, `#[access_control]`
- When role is ambiguous, flag as **"Restricted (review required)"** with the restriction pattern noted

### 3. Contract-Only (Internal Integration Points)
Functions whose enforced caller restrictions limit them to other contracts. Cite
the actual check and the identity or provenance of the permitted caller. A
callback name, implemented interface, or intended integration is not access control.

- A callback without caller checks is **Public (Unrestricted)**.
- A check against a configured address is **Restricted (Review Required)** if its
  identity is unresolved; use **Contract-Only** when that address is established as
  the integration contract.
- `msg.sender != tx.origin` establishes a call-path condition, not authentication
  of a trusted protocol. Record that condition without inferring a trusted caller.

## Output Format

Generate a markdown report with this structure:

```markdown
# Entry Point Analysis: [Project Name]

**Analyzed**: [timestamp]
**Scope**: [directories analyzed or "full codebase"]
**Languages**: [detected languages]
**Focus**: State-changing functions only (view/pure excluded)

## Summary

| Category | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Public (Unrestricted) | X |
| Role-Restricted | X |
| Restricted (Review Required) | X |
| Contract-Only | X |
| **Total** | **X** |

---

## Public Entry Points (Unrestricted)

State-changing functions callable by anyone—prioritize for attack surface analysis.

| Function | File | Notes |
|----------|------|-------|
| `functionName(params)` | `path/to/file.sol:L42` | Brief note if relevant |

---

## Role-Restricted Entry Points

### Admin / Owner
| Function | File | Restriction |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `setFee(uint256)` | `Config.sol:L15` | `onlyOwner` |

### Governance
| Function | File | Restriction |
|----------|------|-------------|

### Guardian / Pauser
| Function | File | Restriction |
|----------|------|-------------|

### Other Roles
| Function | File | Restriction | Role |
|----------|------|-------------|------|

---

## Restricted (Review Required)

Functions with access control patterns that need manual verification.

| Function | File | Pattern | Why Review |
|----------|------|---------|------------|
| `execute(bytes)` | `Executor.sol:L88` | `require(trusted[msg.sender])` | Dynamic trust list |

---

## Contract-Only (Internal Integration Points)

Functions only callable by other contracts—useful for understanding trust boundaries.

| Function | File | Expected Caller |
|----------|------|-----------------|
| `onFlashLoan(...)` | `Vault.sol:L200` | Flash loan provider |

---

## Files Analyzed

- `path/to/file1.sol` (X state-changing entry points)
- `path/to/file2.sol` (X state-changing entry points)
```

## Filtering

When user specifies a directory filter:
- Only analyze files within that path
- Note the filter in the report header
- Example: "Analyze only `src/core/`" → scope = `src/core/`

## Analysis Guidelines

1. **Be thorough**: Don't skip files. Every state-changing externally callable function matters.
2. **Be conservative**: When uncertain about access level, flag for review rather than miscategorize.
3. **Skip read-only**: Exclude `view`, `pure`, and equivalent read-only functions.
4. **Note inheritance**: If a function's access control comes from a parent contract, note this.
5. **Track modifiers**: List all access-related modifiers/decorators applied to each function.
6. **Identify patterns**: Look for common patterns like:
   - Initializer functions (often unrestricted on first call)
   - Upgrade functions (high-privilege)
   - Emergency/pause functions (guardian-level)
   - Fee/parameter setters (admin-level)
   - Token transfers and approvals (often public)

## Common Role Patterns by Protocol Type

| Protocol Type | Common Roles |
|---------------|--------------|
| DEX | `owner`, `feeManager`, `pairCreator` |
| Lending | `admin`, `guardian`, `liquidator`, `oracle` |
| Governance | `proposer`, `executor`, `canceller`, `timelock` |
| NFT | `minter`, `admin`, `royaltyReceiver` |
| Bridge | `relayer`, `guardian`, `validator`, `operator` |
| Vault/Yield | `strategist`, `keeper`, `harvester`, `manager` |

## Rationalizations to Reject

When analyzing entry points, reject these shortcuts:
- "This function looks standard" → Still classify it; standard functions can have non-standard access control
- "The modifier name is clear" → Verify the modifier's actual implementation
- "This is obviously admin-only" → Trace the actual restriction; "obvious" assumptions miss subtle bypasses
- "I'll skip the callbacks" → Callbacks define trust boundaries; always include them
- "It doesn't modify much state" → Any state change can be exploited; include all non-view functions

## Error Handling

If a file cannot be parsed:
1. Note it in the report under "Analysis Warnings"
2. Continue with remaining files
3. Suggest manual review for unparsable files
Pliki w paczce (10)
  • SKILL.md 10 KB
  • agents/openai.yaml 1 KB
  • assets/trail-of-bits-mark.svg 3 KB
  • references/cosmwasm.md 5 KB
  • references/move-aptos.md 4 KB
  • references/move-sui.md 3 KB
  • references/solana.md 5 KB
  • references/solidity.md 6 KB
  • references/ton.md 5 KB
  • references/vyper.md 4 KB

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Ta strona · trailofbits/skills100CC-BY-SA-4.0
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Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki b966f328a88e (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)

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