conditional-access-review
/conditional-access-review
Sprawdza polityki dostępu warunkowego Microsoft Entra pod kątem luk w MFA, blokowania starego uwierzytelniania i wyjątków, na podstawie logów logowania.
- Autor
- kaandgnsh ↗
- Repozytorium
- Claude-Blue ↗
- Licencja
- MIT
- Ostatnia zmiana repozytorium
- 01.11.2026
Ocena i bezpieczeństwo
- Pliki w paczce
- 1
- Skrypty
- 0
- Komentarze HTML
- 0
- Adresy URL w SKILL.md
- 4
Brak sygnałów. Repozytorium zmienione 01.11.2026, bez odwołań do wycofanych modeli i API.
MIT, otwarta: można używać i zmieniać, z zachowaniem informacji o autorze.
Co robi i kiedy
Sprawdza polityki dostępu warunkowego Microsoft Entra pod kątem luk w MFA, blokowania starego uwierzytelniania i wyjątków, na podstawie logów logowania.
Oryginalny opis (EN)
Review Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for gaps — MFA coverage for all users and apps, phishing-resistant MFA for admins, legacy authentication blocking, device compliance, token protection, risk-based policies, exclusions and report-only policies — using policy exports and sign-in log evidence. Use when assessing Entra ID security, troubleshooting why a sign-in wasn't challenged, or after an account takeover.
Jak działa
- Export policies
- Baseline policy set (Microsoft guidance)
- Gap analysis with sign-in evidence
- Common weaknesses
- Output
- Related skills
- References
Podgląd SKILL.md
--- name: conditional-access-review description: Review Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for gaps — MFA coverage for all users and apps, phishing-resistant MFA for admins, legacy authentication blocking, device compliance, token protection, risk-based policies, exclusions and report-only policies — using policy exports and sign-in log evidence. Use when assessing Entra ID security, troubleshooting why a sign-in wasn't challenged, or after an account takeover. license: MIT metadata: category: azure-security version: "2.0.0" verification: documented --- # Conditional Access Review ## Export policies ```powershell Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.Read.All" Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -All | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 10 > ca-policies.json ``` Tools: Microsoft's CA templates / "What If", Maester (Pester-based Entra tests: `Invoke-Maester`), CISA ScubaGear for M365 baselines (`Invoke-SCuBA`). ## Baseline policy set (Microsoft guidance) 1. Require MFA for **all users, all resources** (exclude only break-glass accounts). 2. Require **phishing-resistant MFA** (FIDO2, Windows Hello for Business, certificate-based) for privileged roles (authentication strength). 3. **Block legacy authentication** (client apps: Exchange ActiveSync, other clients). 4. Require MFA for Azure management (Windows Azure Service Management API / Microsoft Admin Portals). 5. Require compliant or hybrid-joined device for sensitive apps or for admins. 6. Sign-in risk / user risk policies (Entra ID P2): require MFA / password change. 7. Block or restrict device code flow and authentication transfer where not needed. 8. Token protection (session binding) for supported apps where licensed. ## Gap analysis with sign-in evidence ```kusto SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d) and ResultType == "0" | where AuthenticationRequirement == "singleFactorAuthentication" | summarize count(), apps=make_set(AppDisplayName, 20) by UserPrincipalName, ClientAppUsed | order by count_ desc ``` Shows real single-factor successes — each is a gap or an intended exclusion. Also check `ConditionalAccessStatus == "notApplied"`. ## Common weaknesses - Exclusions for groups that grow (e.g., "MFA exclusions" with dozens of users), service accounts used interactively, trusted named locations covering whole ISP ranges, policies left in **report-only**, guest users excluded, "All cloud apps" missing for some policies, device platform conditions bypassable with unknown platforms. - Break-glass accounts without alerting on use. ## Output `Policy | State | Users/apps scope | Exclusions (count, justification) | Gap | Evidence (sign-ins) | Recommendation` ## Related skills `entra-signin-investigation`, `authentication-policy-review`, `azure-rbac-review`, `token-theft-investigation` ## References - Conditional Access policy templates: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-conditional-access-policy-common - Authentication strengths: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths - Maester: https://maester.dev/ - CISA ScubaGear: https://github.com/cisagov/ScubaGear
Wersje
| Repozytorium | Wynik | Licencja |
|---|---|---|
| Ta strona · kaandgnsh/Claude-Blue | 100 | MIT |
| openadminos/greybeard | 100 | MIT |
Migawka bazy z 13.11.2026 · wersja paczki c9a41e05a28d (skrót SHA-256 całej paczki)
Pobrania w ostatnich 30 dniach: 0 · ranking
Zgłoś problem z tym skillem: szkodliwa treść, błędny opis albo prośba autora o usunięcie.
Podobne skille
- 90implementing-conditional-access-policies-azure-ad
Konfiguruje polityki Warunkowego Dostępu w Microsoft Entra ID zgodnie z zasadą zero trust i wytycznymi NIST SP 1800-35. - 100entra-signin-rca
Analizuje logi logowania Microsoft Entra ID i wskazuje, która polityka Conditional Access blokuje użytkownika lub urządzenie. - 100entra-signin-investigation
Bada logowania w Microsoft Entra ID, wyjaśnia kody błędów, wyniki Conditional Access i ryzykowne logowania przez KQL i Graph. - 100azure-entra-id-specialist
Wspiera specjalistyczne prace z Microsoft Entra ID: Conditional Access, metody uwierzytelniania, MFA i SSPR, identity protection, tożsamości aplikacji i przeglądy kontroli tożsamości w tenancie. - 95implementing-passwordless-auth-with-microsoft-entra
Wdraża logowanie bez haseł w Microsoft Entra ID przez klucze FIDO2, Windows Hello, passkeye i certyfikaty, z polityką odpornego na phishing MFA. - 90authentication-policy-review
Przegląda politykę uwierzytelniania i MFA u dostawców tożsamości: pokrycie MFA, siłę metod, hasła i procedury odzyskiwania.