stride
/stride
Run a STRIDE threat model over a system: build/ingest a DFD, then enumerate Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege threats per element and trust-boundary crossing, with mitigations. Use when threat modeling an application, service, or design.
- Author
- jassics ↗
- Repository
- awesome-claude-security ↗
- Licence
- GPL-3.0
- Last repository change
- 07.08.2026
Assessment and security
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No signals detected. Repository changed on 07.08.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
GPL-3.0, otwarta.
What it does and when to use it
Run a STRIDE threat model over a system: build/ingest a DFD, then enumerate Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege threats per element and trust-boundary crossing, with mitigations. Use when threat modeling an application, service, or design.
Original author description
Run a STRIDE threat model over a system: build/ingest a DFD, then enumerate Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege threats per element and trust-boundary crossing, with mitigations. Use when threat modeling an application, service, or design.
How it works
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SKILL.md preview
--- name: stride description: >- Run a STRIDE threat model over a system: build/ingest a DFD, then enumerate Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege threats per element and trust-boundary crossing, with mitigations. Use when threat modeling an application, service, or design. --- # Goal A STRIDE threat model: each DFD element and trust-boundary crossing examined for the six threat classes, threats recorded with risk, and each mapped to a mitigation. # STRIDE ↔ property | Threat | Violates | Typical mitigation theme | | --- | --- | --- | | **S**poofing | Authentication | Strong authn, MFA, mutual TLS, signed tokens | | **T**ampering | Integrity | Input validation, signing, integrity checks, least privilege writes | | **R**epudiation | Non-repudiation | Audit logging, tamper-evident logs, timestamps | | **I**nformation disclosure | Confidentiality | Encryption in transit/at rest, authz, data minimization | | **D**enial of service | Availability | Rate limiting, quotas, autoscaling, timeouts | | **E**levation of privilege | Authorization | Least privilege, authz checks, sandboxing, segmentation | # Steps 1. **Get the DFD.** If none exists, invoke `security-diagramming:threat-model-dfd` first. Confirm elements (external entities, processes, data stores, flows) and trust boundaries. 2. **Per element/flow, walk all six letters.** Focus on **trust-boundary crossings** — that's where threats concentrate. Apply only the letters that make sense for the element type (e.g. data stores rarely "spoof"). 3. **Record each threat**: ID · element · STRIDE class · description · preconditions. 4. **Rank** with `/threat-modeling:risk-rank` (likelihood × impact). 5. **Map mitigations** per threat; note existing controls vs. gaps. 6. Optionally model the top threats as attack trees (`security-diagramming:attack-tree`). # Output A STRIDE table (element · STRIDE class · threat · risk · mitigation · status) plus a short "top risks & recommended controls" summary. Hand to `security-reporting` if a formal document is needed. # Notes Don't force all six letters onto every element — apply per element type. Tie each threat to a real data flow so it's concrete and testable.
Versions
| Repository | Score | Licence |
|---|---|---|
| This page · jassics/awesome-claude-security | 90 | GPL-3.0 |
| florianbuetow/claude-code | 100 | MIT |
Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version d44e678f56aa (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)
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