security
/security
Review a Flutter app for security problems - hard-coded secrets, insecure token storage, logging of personal data, missing certificate pinning, unvalidated deep links, debug flags in release, and platform configuration - and fix them. Use before a release, for apps handling money, health or personal data, or when the user asks for a security review.
- Author
- ChandraChaan ↗
- Repository
- flutter-agent-skills ↗
- Licence
- MIT
- Last repository change
- 27.10.2026
Assessment and security
- Files in this package
- 1
- Scripts
- 0
- HTML comments
- 0
- URLs in SKILL.md
- 0
No signals detected. Repository changed on 27.10.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.
What it does and when to use it
Review a Flutter app for security problems - hard-coded secrets, insecure token storage, logging of personal data, missing certificate pinning, unvalidated deep links, debug flags in release, and platform configuration - and fix them. Use before a release, for apps handling money, health or personal data, or when the user asks for a security review.
Original author description
Review a Flutter app for security problems - hard-coded secrets, insecure token storage, logging of personal data, missing certificate pinning, unvalidated deep links, debug flags in release, and platform configuration - and fix them. Use before a release, for apps handling money, health or personal data, or when the user asks for a security review.
How it works
- 1. Secrets in the code
- 2. Storage
- 3. Network
- 4. Logging and analytics
- 5. Input from outside
- 6. Release configuration
- 7. Device integrity (money and health apps)
- Report
SKILL.md preview
---
name: security
description: Review a Flutter app for security problems - hard-coded secrets, insecure token storage, logging of personal data, missing certificate pinning, unvalidated deep links, debug flags in release, and platform configuration - and fix them. Use before a release, for apps handling money, health or personal data, or when the user asks for a security review.
---
# Flutter security review
Work through each area, record findings with file and line, and fix what's safe to fix. Don't paste any secret you find into chat or commit messages: refer to it by file and line.
## 1. Secrets in the code
```bash
git grep -nIE "(api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|BEGIN (RSA|EC|PRIVATE)|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|sk_live_|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})" -- . ':!*.lock'
```
- Anything compiled into the app can be extracted. Keys for paid or privileged APIs must move to a backend.
- Firebase config (`google-services.json`, `GoogleService-Info.plist`) isn't secret, but it must be protected by security rules and App Check.
- Build-time config: `--dart-define-from-file=config/prod.json`, with that file outside git.
- If a real secret was ever committed, it must be **rotated**: removing it from history isn't enough. Tell the user.
## 2. Storage
| Data | Where |
|---|---|
| Access and refresh tokens, credentials | `flutter_secure_storage` (Keychain / Keystore) |
| Personal or financial data cached offline | Encrypted database (SQLCipher / drift with encryption) or encrypted files |
| Preferences, flags | `SharedPreferences` is fine |
Check that logout deletes tokens and cached personal data.
## 3. Network
- HTTPS only. Android: no `usesCleartextTraffic="true"` in release; iOS: no broad `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads`.
- For money or health apps, **certificate (public key) pinning** with at least one backup pin and a plan for rotation.
- No disabled certificate checks (`badCertificateCallback` returning `true`) outside debug.
- Timeouts on every request; don't put tokens or personal data in URLs (they end up in logs).
## 4. Logging and analytics
Search for `print(`, `debugPrint(`, `log(` and the logger: no tokens, OTPs, passwords, card or ID numbers (Aadhaar, PAN), health values, or full request/response bodies. Crash reports and analytics events follow the same rule.
## 5. Input from outside
- **Deep links and app links:** validate host, path and parameters; never navigate to an arbitrary URL or perform an action (payment, account change) straight from a link without confirmation.
- **Push payloads:** treat as untrusted hints; fetch real data from the API.
- **WebViews:** restrict navigation to allowed origins; don't expose JavaScript channels to arbitrary pages.
- Android: `exported` components only where needed; check `intent-filter`s.
## 6. Release configuration
- Release builds: `--obfuscate --split-debug-info=build/symbols` (upload symbols to the crash reporter).
- No debug banners, test endpoints, verbose logging or developer menus reachable in release (`kReleaseMode` checks).
- Android: `android:allowBackup="false"` (or backup rules excluding sensitive files) for sensitive apps; `FLAG_SECURE` on screens with secrets.
- iOS: hide sensitive content in the app switcher snapshot.
## 7. Device integrity (money and health apps)
Consider Play Integrity / App Attest checks on the server for sensitive operations, and limiting features on rooted or jailbroken devices. These raise the bar; they're not a guarantee.
## Report
A table: **severity** (high, medium, low) → **finding** (file:line) → **fix made or recommended**. High: exposed secrets, tokens in plain storage, disabled TLS checks, unvalidated actions from links. Say clearly what still needs a human or backend change.
Versions
| Repository | Score | Licence |
|---|---|---|
| This page · ChandraChaan/flutter-agent-skills | 100 | MIT |
| flavien-ia/hypervibe-craft | 100 | Apache-2.0 |
| boshu2/agentops | 100 | Apache-2.0 |
| iamalisson/landspec | 100 | MIT |
| asckye/tia_portal_openness_mcp | 100 | MIT |
| Esposter/Esposter | 100 | Apache-2.0 |
| event4u-app/agent-config | 100 | MIT |
| motormetrics/motormetrics | 100 | MIT |
| motormetrics/motormetrics | 100 | MIT |
Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version f5a7e0dd0133 (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)
Downloads in the last 30 days: 0 · ranking
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