php2shell-emergency
/php2shell-emergency
Emergency exposure + compromise check for PHP estates during the PHP2Shell window (CVE-2026-109618/109619, Oct 2026, RCE in multipart parsing, CVSS 9.2) — an authorized emergency-check runbook. Covers WordPress, Bitrix and custom PHP on VPS/shared hosting. Triggers on php2shell, CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619, экстренная проверка PHP, RCE в PHP, вебшелл поиск, сайт взломан проверка.
- Author
- serejaris ↗
- Repository
- cyber ↗
- Licence
- MIT
- Last repository change
- 04.11.2026
Assessment and security
- Files in this package
- 4
- Scripts
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- HTML comments
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- URLs in SKILL.md
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No signals detected. Repository changed on 04.11.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.
What it does and when to use it
Emergency exposure + compromise check for PHP estates during the PHP2Shell window (CVE-2026-109618/109619, Oct 2026, RCE in multipart parsing, CVSS 9.2) — an authorized emergency-check runbook. Covers WordPress, Bitrix and custom PHP on VPS/shared hosting. Triggers on php2shell, CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619, экстренная проверка PHP, RCE в PHP, вебшелл поиск, сайт взломан проверка.
Original author description
Emergency exposure + compromise check for PHP estates during the PHP2Shell window (CVE-2026-109618/109619, Oct 2026, RCE in multipart parsing, CVSS 9.2) — an authorized emergency-check runbook. Covers WordPress, Bitrix and custom PHP on VPS/shared hosting. Triggers on php2shell, CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619, экстренная проверка PHP, RCE в PHP, вебшелл поиск, сайт взломан проверка.
How it works
- Scope
- Event snapshot — 2026-10-21 (mutable, refresh at delivery time)
- Ground rules
- Phase A — Exposure assessment (per host)
- Phase B — Compromise hunt (attacks are live since 07:43 UTC)
- Phase C — Emergency mitigation (only until patched)
- Phase D — Patch & verify
- Phase E — Report & delivery
- Lab use — exploit validation & agent evals
- Lookup references
SKILL.md preview
--- name: php2shell-emergency description: Emergency exposure + compromise check for PHP estates during the PHP2Shell window (CVE-2026-109618/109619, Oct 2026, RCE in multipart parsing, CVSS 9.2) — an authorized emergency-check runbook. Covers WordPress, Bitrix and custom PHP on VPS/shared hosting. Triggers on php2shell, CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619, экстренная проверка PHP, RCE в PHP, вебшелл поиск, сайт взломан проверка. metadata: short-description: PHP2Shell emergency exposure & compromise check --- # PHP2Shell Emergency Check (authorized engagements) ## Scope Rapid assessment of a PHP estate during the PHP2Shell event: **exposure verdict → compromise verdict → emergency mitigation → patch verification**, delivered as an evidence-based report within the same day. Default shape: WordPress or Bitrix (or custom PHP) on a VPS or shared hosting, nginx/Apache + PHP-FPM. Written ROE before any active check; everything here is read-only + log/file inspection by default. Exploit validation runs ONLY in the isolated lab (see Lab use below), never on client infrastructure. ## Event snapshot — 2026-10-21 (mutable, refresh at delivery time) - Two critical RCEs in PHP core, CVSS v4.0 9.2 each. CVE IDs CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 per CERT-EU advisory 2026-018 and leak coverage; MITRE records were not yet visible pre-release — cite the CERT-EU advisory as the identifier source in client reports. - Vector (per Sansec/Patchstack): bugs in `multipart/form-data` body parsing + session upload progress, firing **before application code runs** — app version (WP/Bitrix) and app-level auth are irrelevant. - Affected: every PHP from 5.4 per leaked tool banner + researcher consensus; fixes exist only for 8.2+. - Public exploits verified on test systems (RUS-CERT); active attacks observed from 07:43 UTC 21 Oct; mass exploitation expected. - Emergency release landed 2026-10-21 14:00 UTC (16:00 CEST). Confirmed fixed versions: **8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35**. Branches ≤8.1 are EOL — no php.net patch; any fix there is the OS vendor's backport (Debian/Ubuntu LTS). Still verify live before version-gating a client: ```bash curl -s https://www.php.net/downloads/ | grep -oE "8\.[2-5]\.[0-9]+" | sort -Vu curl -s https://api.github.com/repos/php/php-src/releases?per_page=10 | grep -E "tag_name|published_at" | head ``` - Interim mitigations are leaky (CONFIRMED, RUS-CERT): sending **duplicate Content-Type headers** bypasses content-type filters; PHP-FPM is confirmed vulnerable (the "LiteSpeed-only" rumor is false); `file_uploads=Off` does NOT help — PHP still parses the multipart body. - Canonical sources to re-check: php.net/archive/2026.php, CERT-EU 2026-018, RUS-CERT blog 2026-10-21, Huntress rapid-response, Sansec research, watchTowr FAQ, NCSC-NL/php2shell repo. ## Ground rules - Findings need evidence (command + output); statuses candidate/validated/disproven/inconclusive; severity P0–P4. Unpatched internet-facing PHP here is **P0**; confirmed webshell is **P0 + incident response**. - All client-facing probes run from a dedicated, access-controlled operator/jump host — never from a client server or the lab. - Client prod is never exploited to "prove" the vuln — the version gate (Phase A) is the proof. Working PoCs only exist for the lab. - Shared-hosting clients: check what's visible (headers, phpinfo leaks, hoster status pages) and drive the hoster; don't get shell. ## Phase A — Exposure assessment (per host) 1. Inventory PHP per property: version + SAPI + pool config. Externally: `curl -sI https://<host>/ | grep -iE 'x-powered-by|server'`; probe `/phpinfo.php`, `/_phpinfo.php`, `/info.php`, `test.php` (a default-file sweep covers the rest). With client shell access: `php -v; php-fpm8. -v; grep -rE '^(pm|listen)' /etc/php/*/fpm/pool.d/`. 2. Version-gate against the live fixed numbers (see snapshot). Vulnerable & internet-facing → P0. EOL branch (≤8.1) → P0 + migration plan, no patch path exists. 3. Config posture that shapes urgency: `php -i | grep -E 'session.upload_progress|session.use_strict_mode'` (upload_progress On = stock = worst case; strict_mode Off adds risk). Note: strict_mode is ineffective when sessions live in Redis/DB. 4. App layer inventory (WP/Bitrix/custom) + where uploads are accepted (any multipart endpoint = the attack surface; blocking it is Phase C's trade-off). ## Phase B — Compromise hunt (attacks are live since 07:43 UTC) Assume the client may already be hit; hunt before advising patches. Full runbook with one-liners: `references/detection.md`. Priorities: 1. Recently modified/unexpected `.php` in webroot + uploads dirs. 2. Webshell pattern grep (eval/base64/gzinflate/system/shell_exec chains). 3. WordPress: `wp core verify-checksums --include-root`; Bitrix paths in `references/ru-market.md`. 4. Access logs: multipart POSTs, POSTs to odd `.php`, anomalous sizes. 5. Runtime: php-fpm children spawning shells/curl/wget (process-watcher, Sigma rules — see detection.md). Blind spot: in-process PHP shells. 6. Persistence: cron, systemd units, authorized_keys, new users. 7. Any confirmed webshell → switch to IR mode: isolate host, preserve logs, rotate credentials + DB passwords (separate engagement). ## Phase C — Emergency mitigation (only until patched) Config details + caveats: `references/mitigation.md`. In one line: block `multipart/form-data` at the web server, disable `session.upload_progress`, enable `session.use_strict_mode`, or go GET/HEAD-only / maintenance / origin-lockdown behind Cloudflare (their Managed Ruleset "Anomalous Execution 1–7" emergency rules cover all plans). **These stop known exploits, not the class** (RUS-CERT: bypassed in tests; PHP devs: patching is the only real mitigation) — and blocking multipart breaks uploads and some checkouts. Always frame to the client as a hours-to-days bridge, never a fix. Per-CVE interim config (when the patch cannot land yet): - CVE-2026-109619: `session.upload_progress.enabled=0` globally + restart php-fpm workers. - CVE-2026-109618: `memory_limit = -1` pinned via `php_admin_value` (no in-code override; removes the in-process OOM trigger), `post_max_size` 8M; real memory caps at the cgroup level (Docker/LXC) — NOT `RLIMIT_AS`/`RLIMIT_DATA`, they provoke the same OOM crash. ## Phase D — Patch & verify 1. VPS: update PHP packages (distro backport or Remi/Sury), verify `php -v` ≥ the live fixed number, restart php-fpm, re-run the Phase A gate on the live site. 2. Docker: `apt upgrade` on the host does not update packages inside images — `docker compose build --no-cache` and restart the containers; until the rebuild the old (vulnerable) code stays in memory, a plain restart runs it again. 3. EOL branch: there is no Phase D — plan migration to 8.3/8.4 (8.2 dies 31 Dec 2026) or isolate/decommission. 4. Shared hosting: check the hoster's status (RU hosters tracked in `references/ru-market.md`), then verify from outside: Site Health (WP) or a header/phpinfo probe. 5. Retest rule: an exposure verdict closes only after a post-patch re-probe shows the fixed version. ## Phase E — Report & delivery Evidence-based report (RU for RU clients) with: event summary (2 lines + CERT-EU link), exposure verdict per property with evidence, compromise hunt results, actions taken/required, patch plan with owners. Deliver within the emergency SLA agreed with the client. ## Lab use — exploit validation & agent evals PoC exploitation runs only in an isolated lab: LXC/VMs on an internal bridge (NAT for setup, no public exposure), WordPress + stock vulnerable PHP from the distro (pre-backport window: anything currently in Debian/Ubuntu repos is vulnerable). Detection on the lab host via process-watcher `php-rce-october-26` configs (eBPF — sees the containers' php-fpm children). Timed agent evals run against this lab (our lab eval). Never point a PoC at anything that resolves publicly; never reuse a lab container as a client-facing host. ## Lookup references | You found / you are doing | Read | |---|---| | Webshell hunt, scanners, process-watcher, Sigma, log patterns | `references/detection.md` | | Interim nginx/Apache/php-fpm configs, WAF options, caveats | `references/mitigation.md` | | RU market: Beget/Timeweb/Reg.ru status, Bitrix specifics | `references/ru-market.md` | ## Source register (2026-10-21 snapshot) php.net/archive/2026.php · cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2026-018/ · cert.uni-stuttgart.de/blog/2026-10-21-php · huntress.com/blog/php2shell-leaked-critical-php-vulnerabilities · sansec.io/research/php2shell · watchtowr.com/intelligence/php-cve-2026-109618-faq · patchstack.com/articles/php-major-vulnerability-alert-10-2026 · developers.cloudflare.com/changelog/post/2026-10-21-emergency-waf-release-cfmr · github.com/Neo23x0/process-watcher (+ emerging-threats/php-rce-october-26) · github.com/NCSC-NL/php2shell
Files in this package (4)
- SKILL.md 9 KB
- references/detection.md 5 KB
- references/mitigation.md 4 KB
- references/ru-market.md 2 KB
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