office-document-analysis
/office-document-analysis
Analyze malicious documents and container files — Office macros (VBA, XLM 4.0), RTF/OLE exploits, remote templates, PDF JavaScript and launch actions, OneNote, LNK, ISO/IMG/ZIP containers, HTML smuggling — with oletools, oledump, pdfid/pdf-parser and LNK parsers. Use when triaging phishing attachments or documents that spawned suspicious processes.
- Author
- kaandgnsh ↗
- Repository
- Claude-Blue ↗
- Licence
- MIT
- Last repository change
- 01.11.2026
Assessment and security
- Files in this package
- 1
- Scripts
- 0
- HTML comments
- 0
- URLs in SKILL.md
- 4
No signals detected. Repository changed on 01.11.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.
What it does and when to use it
Analyze malicious documents and container files — Office macros (VBA, XLM 4.0), RTF/OLE exploits, remote templates, PDF JavaScript and launch actions, OneNote, LNK, ISO/IMG/ZIP containers, HTML smuggling — with oletools, oledump, pdfid/pdf-parser and LNK parsers. Use when triaging phishing attachments or documents that spawned suspicious processes.
Original author description
Analyze malicious documents and container files — Office macros (VBA, XLM 4.0), RTF/OLE exploits, remote templates, PDF JavaScript and launch actions, OneNote, LNK, ISO/IMG/ZIP containers, HTML smuggling — with oletools, oledump, pdfid/pdf-parser and LNK parsers. Use when triaging phishing attachments or documents that spawned suspicious processes.
How it works
- Office (oletools, Didier Stevens tools)
- Containers & shortcuts (post-macro-blocking era)
- Output
- Safety
- Related skills
- References
SKILL.md preview
--- name: office-document-analysis description: Analyze malicious documents and container files — Office macros (VBA, XLM 4.0), RTF/OLE exploits, remote templates, PDF JavaScript and launch actions, OneNote, LNK, ISO/IMG/ZIP containers, HTML smuggling — with oletools, oledump, pdfid/pdf-parser and LNK parsers. Use when triaging phishing attachments or documents that spawned suspicious processes. license: MIT metadata: category: malware-analysis version: "2.0.0" verification: documented --- # Malicious Document Analysis ## Office (oletools, Didier Stevens tools) ```sh oleid invoice.docm # quick risk indicators (macros, encryption, external rels) olevba -a invoice.docm # analysis summary: AutoExec, Suspicious keywords, IOCs olevba --deobf --decode invoice.docm # attempt deobfuscation of strings mraptor invoice.docm # macro raptor: auto-exec + write/exec heuristics oledump.py invoice.doc # list streams; 'M' marks macros oledump.py -s 8 -v invoice.doc # dump stream 8 decompressed VBA rtfobj suspicious.rtf # embedded OLE objects in RTF (equation editor exploits) msoffcrypto-tool -p VelvetSweatshop enc.xls dec.xls # default-password "encrypted" Excel ``` OOXML (`.docx/.xlsx`) are ZIPs: `unzip -l file.docx`; check `word/_rels/settings.xml.rels` for remote template injection (`Target="http..."`, `TargetMode="External"`). XLM 4.0 macros: `XLMMacroDeobfuscator --file sample.xlsm`. ## PDF ```sh pdfid.py doc.pdf # counts of /JS, /JavaScript, /OpenAction, /AA, /Launch, /EmbeddedFile, /URI pdf-parser.py -s /JavaScript doc.pdf ; pdf-parser.py -o 12 -f -d obj12.bin doc.pdf ``` Most PDF phish today are simply links/QR codes to credential pages — extract `/URI` targets. ## Containers & shortcuts (post-macro-blocking era) - ISO/IMG/VHD/ZIP/7z: extract with `7z x` (MOTW may not propagate — the reason attackers use them). - LNK: `lnkparse shortcut.lnk` / `LECmd.exe -f shortcut.lnk` → target, arguments (often `cmd /c` or `powershell -w hidden ...`), working dir, machine ID of creator. - OneNote (`.one`): embedded files; `onedump.py file.one`. - HTML attachments: look for `atob(`, `Blob`, `msSaveOrOpenBlob`, `<a download>` (HTML smuggling) or inline credential forms posting to external URLs. - MSI/MSIX, `.url`, `.search-ms`, `.library-ms`, `.chm` (`hh.exe`) are other common loaders. ## Output `File | sha256 | Type | Technique (macro/template/exploit/smuggling/LNK) | Payload URLs/commands | Dropped files | ATT&CK | Detection ideas` ## Safety Analyze in an isolated VM. Do not enable editing/content in Office on an analysis host connected to anything sensitive; prefer static tools. ## Related skills `phishing-triage`, `script-deobfuscation`, `dynamic-analysis`, `sample-intake` ## References - oletools: https://github.com/decalage2/oletools - Didier Stevens Suite (oledump, pdfid, pdf-parser): https://github.com/DidierStevens/DidierStevensSuite - XLMMacroDeobfuscator: https://github.com/DissectMalware/XLMMacroDeobfuscator - MITRE ATT&CK T1027.006 HTML Smuggling: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006/
Versions
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Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version 65b0153339b1 (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)
Downloads in the last 30 days: 0 · ranking
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