model-serving-security
/model-serving-security
Harden a deployed model inference endpoint — authn/authz, rate limiting and abuse control, input validation, and exposure to model-extraction / inversion / membership-inference attacks. Use when reviewing how a model is served (REST/gRPC, Triton/TorchServe/KServe, or a hosted inference API), not how it was trained.
- Author
- jassics ↗
- Repository
- awesome-claude-security ↗
- Licence
- GPL-3.0
- Last repository change
- 07.08.2026
Assessment and security
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No signals detected. Repository changed on 07.08.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
GPL-3.0, otwarta.
What it does and when to use it
Harden a deployed model inference endpoint — authn/authz, rate limiting and abuse control, input validation, and exposure to model-extraction / inversion / membership-inference attacks. Use when reviewing how a model is served (REST/gRPC, Triton/TorchServe/KServe, or a hosted inference API), not how it was trained.
Original author description
Harden a deployed model inference endpoint — authn/authz, rate limiting and abuse control, input validation, and exposure to model-extraction / inversion / membership-inference attacks. Use when reviewing how a model is served (REST/gRPC, Triton/TorchServe/KServe, or a hosted inference API), not how it was trained.
How it works
SKILL.md has no level-two headings · 47 lines, 320 words
SKILL.md preview
--- name: model-serving-security description: >- Harden a deployed model inference endpoint — authn/authz, rate limiting and abuse control, input validation, and exposure to model-extraction / inversion / membership-inference attacks. Use when reviewing how a model is served (REST/gRPC, Triton/TorchServe/KServe, or a hosted inference API), not how it was trained. --- # Goal An inference endpoint that's authenticated, abuse-resistant, and not leaking the model or its training data through its outputs — covering the serving layer beneath LLM/app-level concerns. # What to review - **AuthN/Z & exposure** — is the endpoint authenticated and authorized per caller? Not publicly reachable without controls? Tenant isolation for multi-tenant serving? - **Rate limiting & abuse / cost** — per-caller quotas to blunt **model extraction** (stealing the model by querying it) and to cap inference cost/DoS. - **Model extraction** — high-volume systematic querying to clone the model; mitigate with rate limits, anomaly detection, output granularity limits, and monitoring. - **Model inversion / membership inference** — outputs (esp. confidence scores/logits) that leak training data or reveal whether a record was in the training set; limit exposed confidence detail. - **Input validation & resource safety** — malformed/adversarial/oversized inputs; tensor/shape validation; timeouts and resource caps to prevent inference DoS. - **Serving infra** — the model server itself (Triton/TorchServe/KServe) patched and hardened; management/metrics endpoints not exposed; no unsafe model auto-loading. # Steps 1. Identify the serving stack, exposure, and who can call it. 2. Check authn/z, rate limiting/quotas, and input validation at the endpoint. 3. Assess extraction/inversion/membership-inference exposure — especially what confidence/score detail is returned. 4. Review the model server's own hardening and management-surface exposure. 5. Recommend controls prioritized by exposure (unauthenticated/public first). # Output A findings list (surface · risk · evidence · fix) plus controls: authn/z, rate limits/quotas, input validation, output-granularity limits, and monitoring. For LLM-specific output risks (prompt injection, jailbreaks) defer to `llm-security`; for the app around it, the appsec plugins. # Notes The model is intellectual property and the training data is a confidentiality boundary — both can leak through a perfectly "working" endpoint via extraction and inversion. Returning raw confidence scores/logits is the quiet enabler of inversion and membership inference; expose the minimum the use case needs. Rate limiting is the single highest-leverage control here.
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