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container-security

/container-security

Harden container images and runtime specs with minimal bases, non-root users, read-only filesystems, and dropped capabilities. Use when writing image or Kubernetes security settings or reviewing a container for privilege risk.

Repository
AI-SKILLS ↗
Licence
MIT
Last repository change
05.09.2026

Assessment and security

90/ 100Class: good
Format25 / 25
Frontmatter with name and description, valid name, description up to 1,024 characters, name matching the folder.
Discoverability25 / 25
Description explains when to use the skill, has a reasonable length and uses third person.
Content25 / 35
At least 150 words and at most 500 lines, headings, step lists, examples or code.
Hygiene15 / 15
No placeholders such as TODO, no Windows paths, with a licence.
Riskno signals detected in the scan
Files in this package
1
Scripts
0
HTML comments
0
URLs in SKILL.md
0
Deprecation

No signals detected. Repository changed on 05.09.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.

Licence

MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.

What it does and when to use it

Harden container images and runtime specs with minimal bases, non-root users, read-only filesystems, and dropped capabilities. Use when writing image or Kubernetes security settings or reviewing a container for privilege risk.

Original author description

Harden container images and runtime specs with minimal bases, non-root users, read-only filesystems, and dropped capabilities. Use when writing image or Kubernetes security settings or reviewing a container for privilege risk.

How it works

  1. Method
  2. Checks
  3. Boundaries
Original SKILL.md headings · 52 lines, 402 words
SKILL.md preview
---
name: container-security
description: Harden container images and runtime specs with minimal bases, non-root users, read-only filesystems, and dropped capabilities. Use when writing image or Kubernetes security settings or reviewing a container for privilege risk.
---

# Container security

A container shares the host kernel, so a breakout turns a compromised app into a
compromised node. What an attacker reaches for after landing is privilege and a
place to write, so the job is to take both away before they ever get there.

## Method

1. **Build from a minimal base.** Prefer distroless, alpine, or scratch over a
   full OS image: fewer packages mean fewer CVEs and no shell to pivot from.
   Scan the final image with Trivy or Grype and fail the build on fixable High
   or Critical findings.
2. **Run as a non-root user.** Add a `USER` directive with a fixed non-zero uid
   and set `runAsNonRoot: true` with an explicit `runAsUser` in the Kubernetes
   securityContext. A process running as uid 0 in the container is uid 0 against
   any kernel bug.
3. **Mount the root filesystem read-only.** Set `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`
   and grant writable tmpfs or volumes only for the paths that truly need writes
   (`/tmp`, a cache dir). An attacker who cannot write cannot drop a binary to
   run.
4. **Drop all Linux capabilities and add none back by default.** Use
   `capabilities: drop: [ALL]` in the securityContext. Most services need zero;
   add one back only with a written reason, such as `NET_BIND_SERVICE` for a
   port below 1024.
5. **Forbid privilege escalation and privileged mode.** Set
   `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false` and `privileged: false`, and refuse
   `hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, and `hostPath` unless a specific need is
   reviewed. A privileged container is effectively root on the host.
6. **Set CPU and memory limits per container.** A compromised or runaway
   workload with no limit can starve every neighbor on the node. Unbounded
   resources are a denial-of-service condition waiting for a trigger.
7. **Keep secrets out of the image.** Mount them as files from the
   orchestrator's secret store, never bake them into layers or plain
   environment variables. Anything `COPY`ed in ships to everyone who can
   pull the image.

## Checks

- Does `docker history` or a layer scan turn up a shell, package manager, or
  secret in the final image?
- Does the container run as non-root with a read-only root filesystem in
  production?
- Are all capabilities dropped, with each one added back individually justified?

## Boundaries

This hardens the container and its runtime spec. Dockerfile build hygiene and
layer caching belong to containerization; cluster-wide enforcement (admission
controllers, Pod Security Standards, network policy) is a platform concern this
skill feeds rather than owns.

Versions

RepositoryScoreLicence
This page · Amey-Thakur/AI-SKILLS90MIT
claude-dev-suite/claude-dev-suite100MIT
thisiskurubaran/DevSecOps100MIT
snyk/studio-recipes100Apache-2.0
uw-ssec/rse-plugins100BSD-3-Clause
chrishuffman5/domain-expert100MIT
kyleoliveiro/sg-gov-skills90MIT
susorov/agent-skills90MIT

Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version e17f8fe0848b (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)

Downloads in the last 30 days: 0 · ranking

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