audit-security
/audit-security
Use when asked to review a repo's security, before a release or go-live, or after adding auth, uploads, or a new integration. Scans secrets, dependencies, authz, headers and CI supply chain against security-baseline.md; reports ranked findings, fixes only what is approved.
- Author
- velimirmueller ↗
- Repository
- ai-development-skills ↗
- Licence
- MIT
- Last repository change
- 23.10.2026
Assessment and security
- Files in this package
- 2
- Scripts
- 0
- HTML comments
- 0
- URLs in SKILL.md
- 0
No signals detected. Repository changed on 23.10.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.
MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.
What it does and when to use it
Use when asked to review a repo's security, before a release or go-live, or after adding auth, uploads, or a new integration. Scans secrets, dependencies, authz, headers and CI supply chain against security-baseline.md; reports ranked findings, fixes only what is approved.
Original author description
Use when asked to review a repo's security, before a release or go-live, or after adding auth, uploads, or a new integration. Scans secrets, dependencies, authz, headers and CI supply chain against security-baseline.md; reports ranked findings, fixes only what is approved.
How it works
- 1. Audit scope (change nothing)
- 2. Decide
- 3. Check tool versions live
- 4. Run the checks
- 5. Report
- 6. Fix only what is approved
- 7. Verify
SKILL.md preview
--- name: audit-security description: Use when asked to review a repo's security, before a release or go-live, or after adding auth, uploads, or a new integration. Scans secrets, dependencies, authz, headers and CI supply chain against security-baseline.md; reports ranked findings, fixes only what is approved. --- # Audit Security Cross-stack review against [security-baseline.md](../_shared/security-baseline.md) (OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0). Commands per ecosystem and the authz checklist: [security-checks.md](security-checks.md). ## 1. Audit scope (change nothing) ```bash cat .claude/stack-profile.md 2>/dev/null git rev-parse --show-toplevel && git status --porcelain | head ls pnpm-lock.yaml package-lock.json bun.lock uv.lock go.mod Cargo.toml Dockerfile* docker-compose*.yml vercel.json supabase/config.toml *.tf .github/workflows 2>/dev/null ``` Take languages, framework, backend track, database, hosting, IaC and CI from the profile; detect the rest per [stack-profile.md](../_shared/stack-profile.md). Ask one question only when an ambiguity changes what to scan (for example "which of these two services is public-facing?"), and suggest `set-up-stack-profile`. State the scope back in one line: what you will scan and what you skip. ## 2. Decide Pick the checks that apply from [security-checks.md](security-checks.md) by profile: always secrets, dependencies, CI; headers if a web frontend or API exists; authz if there is any user data; IaC if `*.tf`; containers if a Dockerfile exists. ## 3. Check tool versions live Scanners move. Verify the current version and flags per [version-protocol.md](../_shared/version-protocol.md) before running or recommending one (`gh api repos/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/latest --jq .tag_name`). If a tool is not installed, say so and give the install line; run only read-only scanners. Do not install anything without approval. ## 4. Run the checks For each applicable group in [security-checks.md](security-checks.md): run the command, then **read the code** the scanner cannot judge (authorization is almost never found by a scanner). Collect evidence as `path:line`. Never print secret values: show the file, line, rule id and the first 4 characters at most. Groups: (A) secrets in tree and history, (B) dependencies, (C) authorization at the data boundary, (D) input validation and output encoding, (E) headers, cookies, CORS, (F) CI/CD supply chain, (G) config, IaC and containers, (H) logging and errors. ## 5. Report Rank by severity: **Critical** (exploitable now, takeover or data exposure), **High** (exploitable with a precondition), **Medium** (weakens a layer), **Low** (hygiene). Each finding: ``` [Severity] <title> Evidence: <path>:<line> (<rule id or tool>) Baseline: rule <n>; OWASP <A0x:2025>; ASVS v5.0.0-<chapter> Impact: <one sentence: what an attacker gets> Fix: <the exact change> Effort: S/M/L ``` End with: counts per severity, what was **not** checked (and why), and any finding that needs a human decision (for example, "rotate this key": a secret in history is rotated, not removed). Do not pad. No finding without evidence; no "might be vulnerable" without a concrete path. Mark uncertain items as "needs verification" with what to check. ## 6. Fix only what is approved Ask the user which findings to fix (AskUserQuestion, up to 4 per round, Critical and High first). Then, per approved item: make the minimal change, one concern per commit or PR, add a regression test where the check is testable (for example user A cannot read user B's record). Never rewrite git history or rotate credentials without an explicit instruction. A leaked secret: tell the user to rotate it first, then remove it. ## 7. Verify ```bash gitleaks dir . --no-banner --redact # current subcommand per its release notes (v8: `dir`; older: `detect --no-git`); expected: no leaks found ``` Re-run each scanner you ran in step 4 and the tests you added. Expected: approved findings gone, the report's other findings unchanged, no new findings. State the commands and results. A second run of this skill on the same tree reports the same open items.
Files in this package (2)
- SKILL.md 4 KB
- security-checks.md 6 KB
Versions
| Repository | Score | Licence |
|---|---|---|
| This page · velimirmueller/ai-development-skills | 95 | MIT |
| kensaurus/cursor-kenji | 100 | MIT |
| voxtechnologies/transmute-framework | 100 | MIT |
| jerelvelarde/chalk-skills | 100 | MIT |
| charierefiedler/ronce-racine | 90 | MIT |
Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version 33f2c1318959 (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)
Downloads in the last 30 days: 0 · ranking
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