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ap2-vdc-framework

/ap2-vdc-framework

Implement the AP2 Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDC) framework — tamper-evident, cryptographically signed credentials that form the trust foundation for agentic payments. Use when working with the overall VDC architecture, credential issuance, verification, and holder binding.

Licence
MIT
Last repository change
14.09.2026

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No signals detected. Repository changed on 14.09.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.

Licence

MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.

What it does and when to use it

Implement the AP2 Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDC) framework — tamper-evident, cryptographically signed credentials that form the trust foundation for agentic payments. Use when working with the overall VDC architecture, credential issuance, verification, and holder binding.

Original author description

Implement the AP2 Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDC) framework — tamper-evident, cryptographically signed credentials that form the trust foundation for agentic payments. Use when working with the overall VDC architecture, credential issuance, verification, and holder binding.

How it works

  1. Before writing code
  2. Conceptual Architecture
Original SKILL.md headings · 95 lines, 644 words
SKILL.md preview
---
name: ap2-vdc-framework
description: Implement the AP2 Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDC) framework — tamper-evident, cryptographically signed credentials that form the trust foundation for agentic payments. Use when working with the overall VDC architecture, credential issuance, verification, and holder binding.
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Grep, Glob, WebSearch, WebFetch
---

# AP2 Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDC) Framework

## Before writing code

**Fetch live docs**:
1. Fetch `https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/specification/` for the VDC framework specification
2. Fetch `https://ap2-protocol.org/overview/` for VDC conceptual overview
3. Web-search `site:github.com google-agentic-commerce AP2 src/ap2/types mandate` for VDC type definitions
4. Web-search `ap2 protocol verifiable digital credentials VDC` for community guides

## Conceptual Architecture

### What VDCs Are

Verifiable Digital Credentials (VDCs) are **tamper-evident, portable, and cryptographically signed digital objects** that serve as the trust building blocks for AP2 transactions. They provide:
- **Non-repudiation** — Signed credentials prove who authorized what
- **Tamper evidence** — Any modification invalidates the signature
- **Portability** — Credentials can be passed between agents and systems
- **Selective disclosure** — Only necessary data is revealed to each party

### VDC Credential Format

AP2 VDCs use the **SD-JWT with Key Binding (+kb)** format, enabling selective disclosure and cryptographic holder binding.

JSON payloads are canonicalized using **JCS (RFC 8785)** before signing to ensure deterministic serialization.

### Mandate types in AP2

Current releases define **two core mandate types**, each of which can be **open** (constrained, unbound) or **closed** (bound to a specific transaction) — see `ap2-agent-authorization`:

1. **Checkout Mandate** — authorizes completing a specific checkout. *Formerly called the Cart Mandate.*
2. **Payment Mandate** — authorizes payment for that checkout, and gives the payment ecosystem visibility into the agentic context.

The earlier three-type model (Cart / Intent / Payment) folded the human-not-present case into the **open form** of the Checkout Mandate rather than keeping it as a separate credential. Confirm the current type list against the live spec and glossary — this is exactly the sort of thing that moves between releases.

### Extension points

The framework exposes extension points for mandate constraints, checkout objects, payment instruments, and VDC formats, so ecosystems can extend AP2 without forking it.

### VDC Lifecycle

```
1. Creation     → Mandate generated (by Merchant for Cart, by SA for Intent)
2. Signing      → User signs with hardware-backed device key
3. Presentation → Mandate presented to verifying party
4. Verification → Signature and contents validated
5. Usage        → Mandate used to authorize payment
6. Archival     → Mandate stored for dispute resolution/audit
```

### Credential Structure

Every VDC follows a common structure:
- **Contents** — The actual data (transaction details, intent, payment info)
- **Signatures** — Cryptographic signatures from relevant parties
- **Metadata** — Timestamps, IDs, version information

### Trust Model

The VDC trust model involves:
- **Issuer** — Entity that creates and signs the credential (Merchant for Cart, SA for Intent)
- **Holder** — Entity that holds and presents the credential (Shopping Agent)
- **Verifier** — Entity that validates the credential (Payment Processor, Network)
- **Subject** — The user whose authorization the credential represents

### W3C Alignment

AP2 VDCs align with W3C standards:
- **W3C Payment Request API** — Mandate details follow Payment Request structure
- **W3C Verifiable Credentials** — Mandates are expressed as W3C Verifiable Credentials

Checkout Mandates receive both **merchant authorization** (a detached JWS JWT) and **user signature** (hardware-backed device key), forming a dual-authorization model.

### Verification Process

To verify a VDC:
1. **Check signature validity** — Verify cryptographic signatures
2. **Check signer identity** — Confirm the signer is who they claim
3. **Check contents integrity** — Ensure contents haven't been modified
4. **Check temporal validity** — Verify TTL hasn't expired (for Intent Mandates)
5. **Check holder binding** — Confirm the presenter is authorized

### Best Practices

- Always verify VDC signatures before trusting the contents
- Store VDCs with their signatures for audit and dispute resolution
- Use hardware-backed keys for user signatures when available
- Implement proper key rotation and management
- Log all VDC creation and verification events
- Never expose raw VDC signing keys to Shopping Agents
- Test with both valid and invalid signatures to ensure verification works

Fetch the specification for exact VDC schemas, signature formats, and verification algorithms before implementing.

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Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version 540981298783 (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)

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