Skip to content
Skills Library
Security · Review & audit

agentic-security

/agentic-security

Use when auditing the security of an AI-coding-agent setup in a repository: Claude Code project settings and hooks, plugin manifests and hooks.json, .mcp.json and MCP servers, skills, agents and rule files, permission rules, secrets in agent configuration, and CI workflows that run an AI agent on pull requests. Do NOT use for application code vulnerabilities (use security-scan), dependency CVEs (use dependency-audit or cve-research), auth flows (use auth-audit) or HTTP headers (use security-headers).

Repository
agents ↗
Licence
MIT
Last repository change
13.11.2026

Assessment and security

90/ 100Class: good
Format25 / 25
Frontmatter with name and description, valid name, description up to 1,024 characters, name matching the folder.
Discoverability25 / 25
Description explains when to use the skill, has a reasonable length and uses third person.
Content25 / 35
At least 150 words and at most 500 lines, headings, step lists, examples or code.
Hygiene15 / 15
No placeholders such as TODO, no Windows paths, with a licence.
Riskno signals detected in the scan
Files in this package
12
Scripts
0
HTML comments
0
URLs in SKILL.md
0
Deprecation

No signals detected. Repository changed on 13.11.2026, without references to retired models or APIs.

Licence

MIT, open: use and modify while retaining author attribution.

What it does and when to use it

Use when auditing the security of an AI-coding-agent setup in a repository: Claude Code project settings and hooks, plugin manifests and hooks.json, .mcp.json and MCP servers, skills, agents and rule files, permission rules, secrets in agent configuration, and CI workflows that run an AI agent on pull requests. Do NOT use for application code vulnerabilities (use security-scan), dependency CVEs (use dependency-audit or cve-research), auth flows (use auth-audit) or HTTP headers (use security-headers).

Arguments

/agentic-security [path] [--scope trust|hooks|mcp|injection|permissions|secrets|ci]
Original author description

Use when auditing the security of an AI-coding-agent setup in a repository: Claude Code project settings and hooks, plugin manifests and hooks.json, .mcp.json and MCP servers, skills, agents and rule files, permission rules, secrets in agent configuration, and CI workflows that run an AI agent on pull requests. Do NOT use for application code vulnerabilities (use security-scan), dependency CVEs (use dependency-audit or cve-research), auth flows (use auth-audit) or HTTP headers (use security-headers).

How it works

  1. Overview
  2. Audit Areas
  3. Workflow
  4. Critical Rules
  5. References
Original SKILL.md headings · 70 lines, 583 words
SKILL.md preview
---
name: agentic-security
description: "Use when auditing the security of an AI-coding-agent setup in a repository: Claude Code project settings and hooks, plugin manifests and hooks.json, .mcp.json and MCP servers, skills, agents and rule files, permission rules, secrets in agent configuration, and CI workflows that run an AI agent on pull requests. Do NOT use for application code vulnerabilities (use security-scan), dependency CVEs (use dependency-audit or cve-research), auth flows (use auth-audit) or HTTP headers (use security-headers)."
argument-hint: "[path] [--scope trust|hooks|mcp|injection|permissions|secrets|ci]"
user-invocable: true
---

<objective>
This skill audits the attack surface that an AI coding agent adds to a repository: files that
run code before or around the workspace trust dialog, hooks shipped by plugins, MCP servers
and their credentials, prompt-injection paths into the agent's context, permission rules and
bypass modes, secrets stored in agent configuration and memory, and CI jobs that run an agent
on untrusted input.

It reports; it never fixes the audited project and never changes the user's settings. Every
finding carries its evidence (file:line), passes a read-only refutation pass, and cites the
standard entry it maps to, as read on the source named in the references.
</objective>

# Agentic Security Skill

## Overview

Project configuration for an agent is executable: a `.claude/settings.json` hook, an `.mcp.json`
server command or an `env` override runs on the developer's machine. Check Point Research
showed this end to end (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852). This skill turns the vendor
documentation into checklists an auditor can run read-only.

## Audit Areas

| Area | What is checked | Reference |
|------|-----------------|-----------|
| Trust boundary | Hooks, `env`, helpers, MCP auto-approval and base-URL overrides that act before trust | [trust-boundary.md](references/trust-boundary.md) |
| Hook supply chain | Plugin `hooks.json`, `plugin.json` `hooks` / `mcpServers` / `userConfig` | [hooks-plugins.md](references/hooks-plugins.md) |
| MCP trust | Every server source, publisher, pinning, env and tokens, tool descriptions | [mcp-trust.md](references/mcp-trust.md) |
| Prompt injection | Untrusted content reaching the agent, instruction files that obey observed content | [prompt-injection.md](references/prompt-injection.md) |
| Permissions | Broad allow rules, deny-rule limits, bypass and auto modes, saved approvals | [permissions.md](references/permissions.md) |
| Secrets | Keys and tokens in settings, `.mcp.json`, hooks, memory and lesson files, `.env` | [secrets.md](references/secrets.md) |
| CI agents | AI review or agent actions running on untrusted pull requests | [ci-agents.md](references/ci-agents.md) |

## Workflow

1. **Inventory** the agent surface of the target path: `.claude/`, `.mcp.json`, `.claude-plugin/`,
   `hooks/`, `skills/`, `agents/`, `CLAUDE.md`, rule and memory files, `.github/workflows/`, and the
   equivalent folders of other agent tools present in the repository.
2. **Run** the checklist of each area in scope ([audit-checklist.md](references/templates/audit-checklist.md)).
3. **Score** each candidate: severity, confidence 1-10, CWE and standard entry from
   [standards-map.md](references/standards-map.md).
4. **Verify**: run the refutation pass in [verification.md](references/verification.md) on every
   candidate. Confidence 8 or more becomes a finding; lower goes to "needs manual review".
5. **Report** with [audit-report.md](references/templates/audit-report.md) to
   `docs/security/YYYY-MM-DD-<scope>.md` inside the audited repository.

## Critical Rules

| Rule | Why |
|------|-----|
| Report only, never fix or change settings | The audit must not alter the trust state it measures |
| Never print a secret value | Report file:line and the secret type only |
| Read `~/.claude`, `~/.codex` and similar only when the owner asks, and read-only | User-level config is outside the audited repository |
| Cite every fact from the reference files | Vendor behavior changes by version; no claim from memory |
| A static read never proves exploitability | See [verification.md](references/verification.md) |

## References

- [Trust boundary](references/trust-boundary.md) — what a repository can run before trust, the two CVEs
- [Hooks and plugins](references/hooks-plugins.md) — plugin hook supply chain
- [MCP trust](references/mcp-trust.md) — server inventory and trust checks
- [Prompt injection](references/prompt-injection.md) — injection paths into the agent
- [Permissions](references/permissions.md) — rules, modes and their documented limits
- [Secrets](references/secrets.md) — secrets in agent configuration and memory
- [CI agents](references/ci-agents.md) — agents in GitHub Actions
- [Standards map](references/standards-map.md) — OWASP LLM / Agentic entries and CWE, as read
- [Verification and limits](references/verification.md) — refutation pass, what the skill does not prove
- [Audit checklist](references/templates/audit-checklist.md) · [Audit report](references/templates/audit-report.md)
Files in this package (12)
  • SKILL.md 5 KB
  • references/ci-agents.md 4 KB
  • references/hooks-plugins.md 4 KB
  • references/mcp-trust.md 4 KB
  • references/permissions.md 5 KB
  • references/prompt-injection.md 5 KB
  • references/secrets.md 4 KB
  • references/standards-map.md 4 KB
  • references/trust-boundary.md 5 KB
  • references/verification.md 4 KB
  • references/templates/audit-checklist.md 3 KB
  • references/templates/audit-report.md 3 KB

Versions

The database has no other skills named agentic-security.

Database snapshot: 13.11.2026 · package version 428524f14fe7 (SHA-256 digest of the entire package)

Downloads in the last 30 days: 0 · ranking

Report a problem with this skill: harmful content, incorrect descriptions or an author’s removal request.

Similar skills

  • 100security-scan
    Scan your Claude Code configuration (.claude/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions. Use when auditing a .claude/ directory — CLAUDE.md,…
  • 100security-scan
    Scan your Claude Code configuration (.gina/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions. Use when auditing a .gina/ directory — CLAUDE.md,…
  • 100security-scan
    Scan your Nemo Code configuration (.nemo/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks NEMO.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions. Use when auditing a .nemo/ directory — NEMO.md, settings.json,…
  • 82security-audit
    Scan the codebase for security vulnerabilities — checks for secrets, auth flaws, dependency risks, and OWASP Top 10 issues. Standalone — works without project setup. Covers secrets, auth, dependencies, and code-level vulnerabilities. Triggers on: "security audit", "scan for…
  • 90config-security-scan
    Statically review a Claude Code / AI-agent setup for security misconfigurations — risky hooks, over-broad permissions, untrusted or cleartext MCP servers, hardcoded secrets, endpoint redirection, over-privileged agents/skills, and prompt-injection in steering files. Use when…
  • 90security-audit
    Use when reviewing code security, auditing dependencies for CVEs, checking configuration or secret security, assessing authentication and authorization patterns, identifying OWASP vulnerabilities (injection, XSS, CSRF), or addressing security concerns about implementations.

Feedback and reports

Your message goes to Bartosz Sokoliński. An email address is needed only for a reply. See the privacy policy.